Antioch University

AURA - Antioch University Repository and Archive
Dissertations & Theses

Student & Alumni Scholarship, including
Dissertations & Theses

2021

Influencing Legislation for Juveniles in the Adult Judicial System:
A Phenomenological Examination of Legal Advocates
Krista F. Franklin
Antioch University Seattle

Follow this and additional works at: https://aura.antioch.edu/etds
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Mental and Social Health
Commons

Recommended Citation
Franklin, K. F. (2021). Influencing Legislation for Juveniles in the Adult Judicial System: A
Phenomenological Examination of Legal Advocates. https://aura.antioch.edu/etds/741

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student & Alumni Scholarship, including
Dissertations & Theses at AURA - Antioch University Repository and Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations & Theses by an authorized administrator of AURA - Antioch University Repository and Archive. For
more information, please contact hhale@antioch.edu, wmcgrath@antioch.edu.

INFLUENCING LEGISLATION FOR JUVENILES IN THE ADULT JUDICIAL SYSTEM:
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF LEGAL ADVOCATES

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of
Antioch University Seattle

In partial fulfillment for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY
by

Krista Franklin
ORCID Scholar No. 0000-0002-2512-5729

June 2021

INFLUENCING LEGISLATION FOR JUVENILES IN THE ADULT JUDICIAL SYSTEM:
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF LEGAL ADVOCATES

This dissertation, by Krista Franklin, has
been approved by the committee members signed below
who recommend that it be accepted by the faculty of
Antioch University Seattle
in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PSYCHOLOGY

Dissertation Committee:

Dana Waters, PsyD, ABPP, Chairperson

Virginia Faller, JD

William Heusler, PsyD

ii

Copyright © 2021 by Krista Franklin
All Rights Reserved

iii

ABSTRACT
INFLUENCING LEGISLATION FOR JUVENILES IN THE ADULT JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF LEGAL ADVOCATES
Krista Franklin
Antioch University Seattle
Seattle, WA

This phenomenological study explores the lived experience of Washington State lawmakers and
legal activists regarding their involvement in passing Washington State Senate Bill 5064 in
February 2014. In response to the 2012 landmark federal Supreme Court decision, Miller v.
Alabama, Senate Bill 5064 reduced the number of crimes for which juveniles could be sentenced
as adults to life without parole. Six interviewees were selected from those who testified in
Olympia, WA. Individual interviews were conducted in an open-ended style. Participants were
asked questions about their motivation for getting involved in this bill, and asked to describe
their experience. The purpose of the study is to inform those in the fields of psychology and law
in order to advocate and support young offenders who are being underserved by the court
system. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and Ohio
Link ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/etd.
Keywords: juveniles, sentencing, culpability
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
On February 12, 2014, Senate Bill 5064, entitled “An Act Relating to Persons Sentenced
for Offenses Committed Prior to Reaching Eighteen Years of Age” passed in Washington State.
Its legislative purpose was to ensure compliance to the Federal Court ruling in Miller vs.
Alabama of 2012, in which the court used the principles outlined in the Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment regarding cruel and unusual punishment. The majority of Supreme Court Justices
held that its protection prohibits “a sentencing scheme” that allows for permanent imprisonment
with no possibility for release for young offenders (age 18 or less) convicted of murder (SB
5064, 2014, p. 2). Furthermore, compliance to the ruling would require that sentencing judges
consider factors including the age of the defendant when the crime was committed. The topic of
this dissertation focuses on the scholarly and legal advocacy work of those who have participated
in the key developments that led to the mandated changes in sentencing that restrict the state’s
power to sentence juveniles to imprisonment for life.
On this issue, I have been influenced by the generation of ideas brought forth by a variety
of psychologists, but community psychologist, Isaac Prilleltensky, stands out as an inspirational
transformational leader. In an article published in 2008, he offered a description of the
relationship between power, oppression, and the role of the psychologist: “The exercise of power
is based on the juxtaposition of wishing, consciously or unconsciously, to change something and
the opportunity, afforded by social and historical circumstances, to do so” (Prilleltensky, 2008, p.
119). The urgency to explore the matters pertaining to juvenile sentencing practices is founded in
the understanding that the American criminal justice system has historically disproportionately
penalized marginalized populations. According to author and public defense lawyer, Bryan
Stevenson (2014), the American justice system treats young offenders particularly harshly: “For
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years we have been the only country in the world that sentences children to life imprisonment
without parole” (p. 15). This kind of discrimination warrants as much research and investigation
those in the field of psychology can give it.
The discussion offered in this dissertation will add a new dimension to the existing body
of research pertaining to the social and psychological experiences forged in and by the juvenile
criminal justice system. In focusing on the history of the development of the juvenile justice
system, I hope to highlight the influences and confluences of many academic fields (particularly
law and psychology), and to contribute to the formation of a process that is continually changing
as new academic and political information is brought to light. More significantly, however, by
incorporating data collected from interviews with activists who have recently advocated for
Washington State’s adaptation of 2012’s federal law, this dissertation intends to contextualize and
explicate the beliefs that motivated a group of six to eight individuals to participate in policy
creation that significantly altered the lives of juveniles who once qualified for incarceration
without the possibility of release.
The primary research question asked of the participants during their interviews addressed
the following: What was the essence of this shared experience? What was the experience like,
and what meaning did it have for those involved, both prior to, and following the Senate Bill’s
passage? This type of curiosity and approach to research is referred to as phenomenological
research, and is one of four primary methods of qualitative psychological research (Creswell,
2014).
This study was designed to highlight the shared experiences of those who supported
juvenile offenders in policy that affects sentencing and, more importantly, to support and
embolden psychologists to take actions that lead to the improvement of the judicial process,
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particularly as regards this vulnerable population. In learning more about the treatment that
young offenders have historically faced, and the kinds of actions undertaken on their behalf,
psychologists and other scholars might be more inclined to advocate for them, and further realize
the possibilities for practitioners to take up new roles in the public sphere. For example, readers
will learn that testifying on behalf of juveniles during the proposal of new bills is open to the
public and, moreover, present an opportunity to directly shape policies in accordance with
psychological theories and practices. Information to be shared by psychologists in these settings
includes updated brain developmental science that suggests the differences between children and
adults, and the amenability of the younger brain to rehabilitation.
While this dissertation seeks primarily to inform psychologists and their practice, this is
an interdisciplinary field of study and needs to be recognized as such. The following review of
the literature incorporates the work of many important academic fields, including pertinent
trajectories and discoveries in law, psychology, sociology, politics, history, and philosophy on the
subject of juvenile criminality and sentencing. In particular, I discuss the history of juvenile
criminality in the United States and trace the development of adult–child distinctions in the
American scholarly community and justice system. The dissertation will then cover key federal
case outcomes that pertained to juvenile cases. Some of them involve young offenders while
others involve sentencing decisions for adult defendants. These are all considered precedentsetting legal standards that apply to juvenile legal matters due to issues that relate to case
outcomes regardless of age. These would include topics Supreme Court justices ultimately
decided were germane to culpability and fairness, such as cognitive impairment and racial bias.
Federal cases are discussed here because they mandate laws that states must adopt, as in the case
of Washington’s Senate Bill limiting the issuance of life without parole sentencing for defendants
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who are accused of crimes committed under the age of 18. At times, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in these selected cases overtly reflect the contributions of policy developers of the day,
and, as will be seen, at times its decisions derive from judicial opinions that stood outside
political tides.
List of Terms
The following definitions have been taken verbatim from Black’s Law Dictionary
(Garner, 2006) and will be used in this study:
Appeal: A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by a higher authority; esp., the
submission of a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher court for review and possible
reversal. (p. 39)
Common law: The body of law based on the English legal system, as distinct from a civil-law
system. (p. 118)
Corporal punishment: Physical punishment; punishment that is inflicted on the body (including
imprisonment). (p. 582)
Court-martial: An ad hoc military court convened under military authority to try someone,
particularly a member of the armed forces, accused of violating the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. (p. 160)
Criminal capacity: The mental ability that a person must possess to be held accountable for a
crime; the ability to understand right from wrong. (p. 86)
Culpable: Guilty, blameworthy. (p. 170)
Defendant: A person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding. (p. 190)
Detention: The act or fact of holding a person in custody; confinement or compulsory delay –
detain. (p. 205)
Diminished capacity: An impaired mental condition—short of insanity—that is caused by
intoxication, trauma or disease that prevents a person from having the mental state necessary to
be held responsible for a crime. (p. 86)
Due process: The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for
the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing
before a tribunal with the power to decide the case. (p. 228)
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Juvenile: A person who has not yet reached the age of 18, at which one should be treated as an
adult by the criminal justice system. (p. 401)
Juvenile delinquent: A minor who is guilty of criminal behavior, usually punishable by special
laws not pertaining to adults. (p. 401)
Mandatory sentence: A sentence set by law with no discretion for the judge to individualize
punishment. (p. 645)
Mitigating circumstance: A fact or situation that does not bear on the question of a defendant’s
guilt but that is considered by the court in imposing punishment and esp. in lessening the severity
of the sentence. (p. 102)
Parens patriae: The state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves. (p. 520)
Rehabilitation: The process of seeking to improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that he
or she can function in a society without committing other crimes. (p. 604)
Status offender: A youth who engages in conduct that—though not criminal by adult
standards—is considered inappropriate enough to bring a charge against the youth in criminal
court; a juvenile who commits a status offense. (p. 504)
Waiver: The voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or
advantage. (p. 768)
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Childhood—A Protected Status
English Common Law
In England, treatment of criminals remained relatively consistent from the 5th century
until the Middle Ages under English common law (Binder et al., 2001). Common law was the
body of policies that governed the criminal justice system in England since the 17th century and
served as precedent for the American judicial system (Merriam Webster, 201). Under English
common law, adults and juveniles were subject to similar punishments, generally inflicting
physical pain on the offender (Binder et al., 2001). Imprisonment was rarely imposed on children
and adolescents. Young offenders underwent the same court proceedings as adults, though they
were periodically given merciful consideration in sentencing and punishment. English common
law served as policy for the earliest settlers of what would become the United States.
Puritanism and Child Development
The American colonists approached child rearing through a puritanical framework
(Binder et al., 2001). Puritanism is defined as “strictness and austerity especially in matters of
religion or conduct” (Merriam-Webster, 2018). Their belief system viewed the family and home
life as the center of moral development which created the conditions for a moral society (Binder
et al., 2001). Children were considered impressionable when it came to experiences in early life,
and caretakers were held accountable for the treatment of them as such. The colonists believed in
discipline but differentiated children from adults due to the perception of their malleability in
character. Early life was regarded as an opportune time to shape children to conform to ideals of
Puritanism which they believed ultimately paved the way to a good afterlife. They believed that a
lack of parental attention was a cause for misbehavior in children. Moreover, developmental
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factors precluded children from the ability to form the intent necessary to be charged and
punished as adults. This idea formed the basis for the protective and nurturing treatment of child
offenders and influenced policy makers in subsequent centuries.
Parens Patriae
Accordingly, reformers from this time operated under a belief that the government should
fulfill its obligation to poor children who were not protected by their family systems. The idea of
the government and community leaders stepping in to assist vulnerable children appears to have
originated from a medieval legal precedent entitled parens patriae, which “was an assertion of
the right of the state to assume the wardship of a child when the natural parents or testamentary
guardians were adjudged unfit to perform their duties” (Binder et al., 2001, p. 204). British
colonists, and the American legal system they helped create, continued to follow common law’s
tenets when considering legal actions involving children (Binder et al., 2001). For example, in
the nation’s early years, the state assumed the authority to take children out of their homes
without engaging in official legal proceedings. A more detailed version of the parens patriae
doctrine developed during the 19th century. This period’s policy creators believed that an
effective way to deal with the problems involving children and crime in urban settings was to
separate juvenile delinquents from their families and neighborhoods, and place them in homes
intended to serve a rehabilitative purpose.
The houses of refuge. The first attempt at accomplishing rehabilitation via a home for
juvenile offenders came with the creation of the “houses of refuge” in New York in 1825
(Abbott, 1938). Its inception resulted from an approach to the problem of young offenders
proposed by an organization known as the Society for the Reformation of Juvenile Delinquents.
It argued that law-breaking children should be formally institutionalized for the purpose of
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rehabilitation. Other large cities on the East coast soon followed New York’s example; within a
few years, Philadelphia and Boston had opened juvenile rehabilitation homes of their own.
The first case to challenge the state’s assumption of parens patriae involved a house of
refuge in Philadelphia (Shepard, 1999). In the case of Ex Parte Crouse (1838), Mary Ann
Crouse’s mother had committed her to a house of refuge for being “an incorrigible child.” Her
father challenged the detainment, asserting that the younger Crouse had been held without
affording her the opportunity of due process. The court upheld the detainment of Crouse on the
grounds that she would fare better if she was institutionalized. It justified its decision as acting as
a protector of the child as well as the public (Binder et al., 2001)
This decision signified an important shift leading to changes in the sentencing of
convicted criminals based on age (Shepard, 1999). The enforcement of equal punishment and
sentencing for adults and juveniles was re-examined as the criminal justice system began to more
deliberately separate these two groups and consider young offenders’ individual capacity to
commit crimes and the chance for rehabilitation as compared to adults. During that time,
increasing numbers of children and adults were incarcerated. As opposed to the previously
customary corporal (physical) punishment, children found themselves mixed in with adult
prisoners, although not forced into physical labor as the adults were. Reformers were concerned
that children and teenagers were being housed with adults who would not only exhibit deviant
behavior, but teach it as well.
Houses of refuge scheduled activities in order to induce residents to perform functions of
facility maintenance as well as rehabilitation (Binder et al., 2001). The detainees lived within a
system of earned privileges, with a variety of food and access to the outside world held as prizes
to be earned through hard work and good behavior. Boys and girls were housed in separate
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dormitories. These dwellings not only housed those convicted of crimes, but also those who were
perceived as budding offenders. This model of juvenile detention was used for the creation of
other residential institutions such as “reform schools” and “cottage systems.” Their
administrators devised programs to both separate offenders from their neighborhoods and teach
them the social and trade skills needed to assimilate into society. This approach exemplified the
belief of the time that juveniles could be effectively rehabilitated.
Adolescence Recognized by the Field of Psychology
Toward the end of the 19th century, the field of psychology gathered increasing authority
and respect as a science in Europe and America. One of the figures credited with contributing to
its recognition as an academic field was psychologist G. Stanley Hall, who was known
historically as an investigator of the effects of evolutionary development and the brain. Among
the first to create research labs devoted to the study of psychology, in 1817, Hall also founded
the first journal dedicated to psychological research and study in the United States–the American
Journal of Psychology–and became the first leader of the American Psychological Association
(Goodwin, 2012). Hall’s theories defined adolescence as a period in human development distinct
from both childhood and adulthood, an idea that echoed those of that era’s reformers. His book,
Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex,
Crime, Religion and Education (1904), was therefore adopted by policy makers, lending
credibility to the contention that juveniles as a group were to be protected as a vulnerable
population. In this text, Hall elaborated on this period of life as one of emotional upheaval and
advocated for particular education and consideration for this stage of development. He
maintained that the teenage years were critical ones during which individuals were influenced by
upbringing and could be taught social skills regardless of the severity of their behavior. Hall’s
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contribution to the burgeoning field of psychology upheld the then popular belief that the
character of adolescents was different than the adult, particularly in the sense that it was more
influenced by stress and amenable to molding.
The First Juvenile Court
In the Chicago area, the above-mentioned studies helped legitimize the call for a more
formalized system for processing juvenile cases (Shepard, 1999). Concurrent with this
movement investigating the effects of urbanization on young offenders was a court case that
challenged the assumed powers of parens patriae: the 1870 case of People ex rel. O’Connell v.
Turner. In this case, the court ruled the detainment of Daniel O’Connell was unlawful on the
grounds that he merely had the potential to commit a crime without having actually committed
any (People v. Turner, 1870). Further, the Chicago reformers proposed a senate bill entitled the
Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899 that outlined a plan providing “a separate court and probation
staff” for juveniles and “forbade” the integration of adult and juvenile inmates (Binder et al.,
2001, p. 215). Despite the outcome of the O’Connell case, the proposed legislation was intended
to invest the new court system with authority over cases involving children who appeared at risk
for criminal activity as well as those actually accused of it. The bill passed, thus establishing the
first juvenile court of the United States.
The new court system was distinct in several important ways. First of all, it did not grant
the same rights to accused juveniles as those granted to accused adults. Defendants were tried in
front of a judge with no jury present. Other participants involved in hearings included “parents
and the probation officer who served as an expert on the subject” (Binder et al., 2001, p. 215).
Decisions to detain juveniles were not founded on demonstrated culpability; rather they were tied
to mitigating factors that would prompt the state to intercede in the role of a parent. Probation
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was frequently ordered instead of incarceration, with defendants generally sent home under the
supervision of a probation officer. These officers played major roles in the lives of delinquents,
serving as both monitors and interventionists on the home front as well as key experts in court
procedures. The first juvenile courts focused on treating the accused in the home setting and
keeping them out of detention centers. Chicago’s creation of a formal juvenile court inspired
other states to follow suit, resulting in juvenile legal policies instituted in most states by 1925
(Shepard, 1999).
The Effects of Urbanization on Juvenile Delinquency Rates
During this time, crime data being considered and valued highlighted the urban poor as
the population most susceptible to criminal activity. In their article, “Juvenile Delinquency and
Urban Areas” (1942), Sociologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay examined the effects
of urbanization within the city of Chicago. Their analysis of data collected since the opening of
Chicago’s juvenile court house focused on statistics of adolescent crime and elucidated a pattern
of criminal activity suggesting that particular districts within the city produced higher rates of
juvenile contact with the court system than others, specifically those inhabited predominantly by
first-generation immigrants. These areas were characterized by lower income per capita than
other areas of the city, the physical deterioration of buildings, and close proximity to industry.
As the city grew, areas within Chicago were distinguished from one another by their
physical or economic characteristics or, at any given moment, by the composition of the
populations. This finding was important in that it led researchers to hypothesize that criminal
activity resulted not from personality traits of a specific group, but from social circumstances
experienced by that group in a given period. This line of thought coincided with society’s belief
in the impressionability of young persons, and that they were more likely to develop deviant
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behavior when oppressed and hence they were not innately criminal. This development
highlighted the importance of considering risks associated with a childhood spent in social
turmoil and insinuated a need for proper nurturance during that period of life.
The Eighth Amendment’s Evolving Standards of Decency
The Trop v. Dulles (1958) case focused on the issue of proportional punishment. In 1944,
the petitioner, an army private stationed in French Morocco, had escaped from detention,
allegedly to evade disciplinary consequence. When he was found, he willingly returned to the
stockade. He was subsequently court-martialed on the charge of desertion and sentenced to three
years of labor. In 1952, the petitioner applied for a passport and was denied, the stated reason
being that he was no longer a citizen based on the court’s decision.
In this Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) case, Chief Justice Warren opined
that the U.S. government needed to intervene in this kind of punishment, which had traditionally
been under the jurisdiction of the military, and commented on this Eighth Amendment issue in
the following way:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase “cruel and unusual” has not been detailed by
this Court, but the basic policy reflected in these words is firmly established in the
Anglo-American tradition of criminal justice … The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to
punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of
civilized standards … The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. (Trop v. Dulles, 1958,
p. 101)
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In short, Warren and the court found the punishment—loss of citizenship and the rights that
normally accompany it—too severe for the client.
A Move Away from Parens Patriae
Until 1960, the country’s evolving system for sentencing and detaining juveniles
continued to capture the attention of policy makers. Despite the growing numbers of correctional
facilities being built, the common belief at the time was that the system’s weaknesses were
attributable to “insufficient resources, not concept” (McGarrell, 1988, p. 7). Interestingly, another
pattern emerged as a concern for the federal judicial branch as SCOTUS issued opinions in two
juvenile cases within a year of each other, both of which supported similar due process rights
granted to adults. This shift, along with other factors, such as increased institutionalization,
showed a movement away from the influence of parens patriae.
A Clarification of Factors Involved in Waiving Juveniles to Adult Court
SCOTUS’s determination after reviewing Kent v. United States in 1966 marked the
emergence of some due process rights for juveniles. In 1961,14-year-old Morris Kent was taken
into custody for allegedly breaking into the apartment of a woman and raping her. Police
searched for him after matching his fingerprints with those found in the apartment. While he was
being detained for suspicion of the crime, his counsel requested that Kent be psychologically
examined. In proving that Kent suffered from a serious mental illness, the attorney intended to
keep him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court system, thereby ensuring that his client
would be considered for its rehabilitative services. Additionally, under the codes of the juvenile
sentencing guidelines, Kent would have been ordered to serve a considerably shorter sentence as
a juvenile than as an adult (Kent v. United States, 1966).
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In his appeal to the Supreme Court (Kent v. United States, 1966), Kent’s lawyer argued
that Kent had not been given the consideration granted to juveniles under the law at that time.
Specifically, he argued that:
Petitioner’s detention and interrogation … were unlawful. He contends that the police
failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act in that they failed to
notify the parents of the child and the Juvenile Court itself … that petitioner was deprived
of this liberty for about a week without the determination of probably cause which would
have been required in the case of an adult … that he was interrogated by the police in the
absence of counsel or parent … [and] without warning of his right to remain silent or
advice as to his right to counsel. (Kent v. United States, 1966, section 551)
Kent, however, was denied the rights given to both juveniles and adults at that time.
Furthermore, despite defense counsel’s request for an investigation of mitigating factors, the
judge ordered that Kent be tried in adult court. The judge declared that he had conducted a “full
investigation” and waived Kent’s juvenile status; this put his case into the hands of the adult
court system and he was thus subject to its harsher sentencing practices. Subsequently, the
sentence given Kent was between 30 and 90 years. SCOTUS ultimately decided in Kent’s favor
by stating that the lower court judge’s waiver of jurisdiction in this case was “invalid.” Kent was
then allowed a new hearing on waiver (Kent v. United States, 1966).
The text of the decision (Kent v. United States, 1966) handed down in this case contains a
representative example of appropriate factors for waiving an adolescent’s right to be tried as a
juvenile rather than in adult court. They were listed as:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of community requires waiver.
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2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint.
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a
crime.
6. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile … by the use of procedures, services, and facilities
currently available to the Juvenile Court. (Kent v. United States, 1966, sections
566–567)
The salient issue in this case was the formalized practice of waiving the juvenile status of
young offenders, which gives the court permission to remove them from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile system and process their cases in adult court, meaning their sentences will be served in
an adult penitentiary. Although the defendant was ultimately served by the particular result of
this case, SCOTUS’s exploration of this matter would grant authority to prosecutors who would
seek to take youth from the protection of the juvenile system, thus solidifying the stripping of
rights previously granted to adolescents.
An Alignment of Due Process Rights Gives Adolescents Similar Protections as Adults
Just one year later, in 1967, SCOTUS reviewed yet another juvenile matter, In Re Gault.
The case involving Gerald Gault was a rejected appeal from the Arizona Supreme Court. In
1964, Gault, age 15, was arrested for placing an obscene phone call, which was illegal in Arizona
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at that time. Gault had been on probation previously and was taken into custody at a juvenile
detention center. Gault’s parents contended that he was not afforded the kind of due process
rights that would have helped his case, including no formal notification of his charges, a lack of
counsel, and an assigned sentence to six years in a training school. As an adult, he would have
qualified for a sentence of several months.
Justice Fortas elaborated on the acknowledgement that juveniles have been protected
under a criminal system that distinguishes them from adults and provides a legal process that
does not mirror the adult system. However, overall, he maintained that adolescents were better
served by being granted the same rights as adults when being tried. He explained that the judicial
forefathers had felt that giving children shorter sentences, detaining them separately from adults,
and making an effort to educate them were measures ethically called for to keep individuals from
spending their adult years languishing within the criminal justice system based on mistakes they
had made in youth. However, he opined, this process, which derived its authority from parens
patriae, was questionable: “The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky
and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance” (In Re Gault, 1967, p. 17). Fortas further
explained as follows:
Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system
for juveniles, unknown to our law in any comparable context. The constitutional and
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is—to say the least—debatable. (p. 18)
Here, he criticized the assumption of protections offered since the time of early America.
He expressed the intention of the court to authorize aligning the expectations of juvenile rights
with those of adults. Although this opinion intended to serve minors who were perceived as
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receiving unfair treatment, his decision nonetheless mandated a change in direction away from
uniform protection of young offenders to those of adults.
Sociologists Help Form First Federal Juvenile Delinquency Policies
As was the case when the U.S. formal juvenile system was first created, the work of
sociologists was considered heavily during policy development in the mid to late 1960s. For
example, under the Kennedy administration, ideas generated by their empirical work helped
guide the President’s focus on juvenile criminal justice issues at the federal level (McGarrell,
1988). The President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (1967) used the
ideas generated from Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) Strain Theory. The researchers postulated that
tension experienced by those who could achieve through merit but are denied actual opportunity
has created the conditions for a class of individuals inclined to commit deviant acts. In 1967, the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice drew guidance
from Lemert’s Labeling Theory (1951) which advanced the notion that individuals who connect
with the criminal justice system are more likely to continue doing so than those who never do.
According to this theory, the negative judgment placed on these individuals by others and
themselves influenced future negative behavior. The ideas derived from these studies suggested
assigning fault to the social structure rather than individual character and called for the
consideration of the developmental needs of young offenders.
Summary: Childhood as a Protected Status
Overall, during the first half of the 20th century, the juvenile criminal system was
characterized by a pattern of viewing the juvenile as belonging to a vulnerable population and in
need of a process that provides parental guidance and, in essence, valuing both punishment and
rehabilitation. The prevailing idea was that young offenders would ideally re-enter society as
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reformed individuals. Juvenile courts were concerned with drawing on the resources of the
community to bring about this change. For example, the President’s Commission of 1967 “urged
policies of decriminalization, diversion and deinstitutionalization” (McGarrell, 1988, p. 8).
Similarly, the SCOTUS decisions from the mid-1960s granting juveniles the same due process
rights as adults reflected a need for protection, albeit one that was slowly diminishing. As the
country continued to witness increases in juvenile crime, however, the nurturing qualities
intended in common law’s parens patriae began to more substantively fade.
Just Desserts
Trends Toward Formalization
During the early 1970s, the legal system continued a largely informal, laissez-faire
approach to dealing with juvenile delinquents. Diversion, a common approach used in managing
young offenders, emphasized sourcing relationships between parents, police, and the community
to handle rehabilitation of the youth (Seljan & Schneider, 1983). The intention behind diversion
was to keep children out of the criminal justice system to the greatest extent possible. The
Lyndon B. Johnson era Commission reports generally supported this approach while stating
concerns about its informality: “There are grave disadvantages and perils … in that vast
continent of sublegal dispositions” (President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 82).
When it became apparent that diversion programs were failing to reduce the number of
juvenile offenses, the legal community turned to the work of theorists who espoused a starkly
different approach to juvenile justice than in the past (McGarrell, 1988). The ideas put forth
called for policy creation that embraced the official processing of youth through the court
system, focusing less on treatment and encouraging a “just desserts” mentality in sentencing
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similar to that of the adult penal system. The other change promoted by contemporary social
theorists was deterrence through punishment. The idea was that juveniles would be more likely
to abide the law after witnessing young offenders receiving longer sentences than they had been
accustomed to in the past. This new approach to juvenile justice was incorporated into
subsequent federal policies via influential associations. For example, the Institute of Judicial
Administration–American Bar Association (1977) and the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force
(1978) endorsed a departure from assessment of the resources needed for rehabilitation and
supported sentencing based on prior convictions and the severity of the crime. In breaking with
the past traditions of diversion programs and lower sentencing standards for juveniles, the
emerging line of thought favored less overall protection of young offenders and was backed by
some of the most powerful political forces in American politics.
SCOTUS Protects Individual Factors
In the midst of the developing movement in the federal and state governments to remove
protections for juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court’s review of the case Furman v. Georgia
(1972) explored the standards for assigning the death penalty for a population they ultimately
guaranteed safeguarding. At that point, the Court heard three combined cases at once: Furman v.
Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, and Branch v. Texas. The title case’s accounting runs as follows:
Mr. Furman broke into a home and shot the owner of the home through a closed door. The owner
died from the gunshot wound. This combined SCOTUS case resulted in a 5–4 vote in favor of
reversing the death penalty sentence for each one, with written opinions from each justice. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas invoked the precedent established through common law:
The words “cruel and unusual” certainly include penalties that are barbaric. But the
words, at least when read in light of English proscription against selective and irregular
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penalties, suggest that it is “cruel and unusual” to apply the death penalty—or any other
penalty—selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society,
and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not
countenance general application across the board. (Furman v. Georgia, 1972, sections
244–245)
The relevance here is that individual factors that make one defendant more vulnerable to harsher
penalties than another now need be weighed, thus officially requiring consideration of details
pertaining to social privilege when sentencing.
The other concurring opinions generally mirrored a concern that each of the three cases
involved young black men, two of whom were evaluated with cognitive impairments, and the
observation that they had been given stricter sentences than others who held more socially
privileged positions. The dissenting opinions voiced a warning that this particular decision would
significantly restrict the practice of handing down death sentences under any conditions. Indeed,
state courts were subsequently obliged to create a clearly defined list of standards to be used for
any and all individuals eligible for a death sentence, thereby forcing courts to abdicate their
power to send offenders to death row arbitrarily (Latzer, 1998).
The decision in this case would become important in sentencing trends for juveniles over
time in the sense that it pronounced the tendency of the court system to overly penalize
defendants based on race. As would be seen in the years ahead, the power SCOTUS granted at
this time to protect individuals from larger political forces was once again used in sentencing.
Despite the growing political and legal pressure to treat juveniles and adults similarly within
most areas of the criminal justice system, the highest court held firmly to maintain a more
parental position.
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Washington State Takes the Lead in Legislating Stricter Laws
Washington State distinguished itself during this time period by completely rewriting its
juvenile code to reflect the trend in thinking. The new code laid out minimum and maximum
sentencing limits for convictions “with quite narrow sentence ranges in between” (Castellano,
1986, p. 482). It did away with adjudication for status offenders—those who had been involved
in the court system for reasons other than criminal acts—such as running away from home,
truancy, or underage drinking. Those individuals were instead sent to the Department of Health
and Human Services for assistance (Castellano, 1986; Seljan & Schneider, 1983). While
Washington did not eliminate diversion programs completely, it formalized the process to the
extent that diversions became increasingly managed by the Department of Corrections via
probation officers. Furthermore, diversions required the young defendant to sign an agreement
which listed violation restrictions and allowed the court to add the current offense to their
criminal history if the contract was breached.
Once a juvenile was contacted by police, the new laws granted prosecutors the role of
overseeing the intake process, during which they decided whether to file a petition (Castellano,
1986). The intake assessment no longer took treatment needs into account; instead it focused on
a “community accountability” approach in which the juvenile would atone for their crimes by
repaying the community in some way and serving a sentence commensurate with the crime
committed. The sentence’s range would ideally correspond to the law’s suggested guidelines, as
opposed to the rationale of an individual judge.
Washington State’s Revised Code represented a culmination and formalization of
handling juvenile cases with a more standardized, punitive approach than previously seen.
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Instead of being treated and shielded from the kind of official documentation that could follow
them in future proceedings, diverted youth were increasingly processed through official legal
channels. Filing procedures became largely authorized by the prosecution. Young defendants
were sentenced in a standardized fashion that incorporated less consideration of individual
factors than before. In short, the line between the juvenile and adult criminal system in the state
became more blurred than it had ever been. Many states subsequently followed suit in adjusting
statutory policy.
A Philosophical Examination of Punishment
French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault (1979) explored the manifestation of
the effects of standardization and formalization within the penal system over its history:
The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the
disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In
short, it normalizes. It is opposed, therefore, term by term, to a judicial penalty whose
essential function is to refer, not to a set of observable phenomena, but to a corpus of
laws and texts that must be remembered; that operates not by differentiating individuals,
but by specifying acts according to a number of general categories; not by hierarchizing,
but quite simply by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of condemnation. (p.
183)
Foucault’s (1979) understanding of the evolution of the criminal justice system, applicable for
both adults and juveniles, noted a pattern of the powerful de-emphasizing of unique factors that
make up individual offenders and their cases. This trend had turned criminal punishment into a
mechanized tool used to subjugate the underprivileged. Therefore, Foucault might have argued
that the decision handed down in the Furman case, which intended to help vulnerable
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populations by establishing a standardized process for sentencing, actually served to formally
deprive them of their chance to be recognized contextually during criminal proceedings in the
future.
Politics Motivate Sentencing
Researchers Schwartz, Steketee, and Butts (1991) analyzed the state of the juvenile
justice system during the 1980s. They expressed concern about the trend toward treating
juveniles as adults in sentencing because it was a response to a perception of growing numbers
and seriousness of crimes, which did not bear out in reality (Cook & Laub, 1986; Galvin & Polk,
1983). Their investigation into the statistics yielded the following conclusion:
Even though popular perceptions of rising juvenile crime rates have been contradicted
frequently by official statistics which show stable, or even declining rates, and despite the
fact that juvenile incarceration rates seem to vary more by political boundaries than by
the incidence of crime, the juvenile justice system inevitably responds to outside pressure
by increasing the use of incarceration. (Schwartz et al., 1991, p. 382)
Their work offered a critical analysis of the information that served as the foundation that
policy developers used to rationalize increasingly harsher punishment of adolescent offenders,
namely the assumption that young people were committing crimes at rates that required the
criminal justice system to take steps to protect the public more stringently than in the past,
resulting in the degradation of special rights for adolescents based on developmental needs.
Reagan’s Influence in the 1980s
As president, Ronald Reagan did not appear to place a lot of interest in juvenile justice,
and in fact attempted to abdicate responsibility. He recommended the federal government
relinquish its role funding juvenile programs and be replaced by funding by state governments
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and private donations. According to Nancy Marion (1994), Reagan repeatedly tried to abolish
federal funding, but Congress blocked his efforts.
Reagan did, however, support stricter sentencing laws for all federal cases. In 1984, he
promoted the Comprehensive Crime Control Act which provided for a Sentencing Commission.
This commission’s members were appointed by Reagan and tasked with producing guidelines for
the Sentencing Reform Act. One commission recommendation included “structured judicial
discretion” which meant, importantly, that judges in federal cases were no longer allowed
discretion to choose from a wide sentencing range; instead, they were given narrower options
(United States Sentencing Commission, n.d). The passing of this act represented the
manifestation of standardized sentencing on a federal level, a trend that had been apparent in
juvenile law since the 1970s.
Competency Examined in Issuance of the Death Penalty
In 1986, SCOTUS reviewed Ford v. Wainwright (1986) in which Alvin Bernard Ford
received the death penalty for murder. The issue of competency had not been raised until 1982
when Ford was observed entertaining grandiose thoughts, believing, for example, that he was the
Pope and affected by a conspiracy involving the Ku Klux Klan. He demonstrated confusion
about his upcoming execution, stating that he would not be put to death because “he owned the
prisons and could control the governor through mind waves” (section 403). In response to his
attorney’s concern about his “competency as a condemned inmate,” the governor assigned a
panel of psychiatrists to evaluate Ford (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, section 404).
Each psychiatrist affirmed Ford’s (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986) delusional thought process
but argued that he understood why he was being condemned to death and that he was going to be
executed. The governor used their reports as a basis for signing Ford’s death warrant. Ford’s
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attorney sought an evidentiary hearing based on the discrepancy between the observations and
conclusions drawn by the different mental health professionals assigned to evaluate Ford. This
case was appealed until it reached SCOTUS for a determination of whether sentencing an
“insane person” to death fell within the purview of “cruel and unusual punishment” (Ford v.
Wainwright, 1986, section 405).
Justice Marshall led the Court with his opinion that the execution of Ford while he
exhibited signs of insanity was unconstitutional in keeping with the logic of common-law:
For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of
executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life … Similarly, the natural abhorrence civilized
societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to come to grips with his own conscience
or deity is still vivid today. (Ford v. Wainwright, 1986, section 409)
The decision in this case closely examined the meaning and importance of the issue of a
defendant’s competency, a matter which would be applied more generally to criminal
blameworthiness in future juvenile cases.
Adolescents Considered Less Culpable Than Adults
In 1988, SCOTUS reviewed Thompson v. Oklahoma. The following facts are attributed.
Along with three accomplices, 15-year-old William Wayne Thompson allegedly murdered his
former brother-in-law. Reportedly, the four perpetrators attacked the deceased in response to his
alleged abuse of both Thompson and his sister. An autopsy revealed the victim’s body bore two
gunshot wounds, multiple stab wounds to the torso, and a broken leg. The victim’s body had
been anchored to a concrete block and thrown in a river. Thompson was found guilty and
sentenced to death.
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Due to the prosecution’s introduction of inadmissible evidence during the trial,
Thompson filed an appeal. The appellate court upheld the lower court’s decisions. The case was
subsequently reviewed by SCOTUS upon which time Justice Stevens stated the following,
referring to preceding cases:
Thus, the Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to
a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The
basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation. Inexperience,
less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the
consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to
be motivated by peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted
with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult. (Thompson v. Oklahoma,
1988, section 835)
Here, SCOTUS clarified the difference in culpability between juveniles and adults by
virtue of developmental maturity. The Court proclaimed an important distinction in allowable
sentencing of offenders based on age that was to then be used when evaluating future penalty
assignments of all juveniles.
The Supreme Court Changes Its Stance on Viewing Adolescents as Uniformly Less Culpable
Than Adults
Within a year, SCOTUS reviewed another juvenile murder. This case overturned the
decision in Thompson, perhaps because of its particularly grisly facts. Kevin Stanford, a
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17-year-old, allegedly robbed, raped, and murdered a gas station attendant with an accomplice
(Stanford v. Kentucky, 1989). A police officer’s account of how Stanford perceived the event was
as follows:
[H]e said, I had to shoot her, [she] lived next door to me and she would recognize me … I
guess we could have tied her up or something or beat [her up] … and tell her if she tells,
we would kill her … Then after he said that he started laughing. (as cited in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 1989, p. 366)
After Stanford was arrested, his rights as a juvenile defendant were waived. With his adult status,
his case was eligible for the death penalty. Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion on this
case which upheld the lower’s court finding and changed its reasoning since Thompson:
Granted, however, that a substantial discrepancy exists, that does not establish the
requisite proposition that the death sentence for offenders under 18 is categorically
unacceptable to prosecutors and juries. To the contrary, it is not only possible, but
overwhelmingly probable, that the very considerations which induce petitioners and their
supporters to believe that death should never be imposed on offenders under 18 cause
prosecutors and juries to believe that it should rarely be imposed. (Standford v. Kentucky,
1989, section 374)
The statements made in this opinion mirrored a lack of confidence felt by the public and
politicians regarding the efficacy of treating juveniles as a protected class within the juvenile
court system.
Fear of the Super Predator
When he wrote the article “The Theory of Moral Poverty” (1995), criminologist John
Dilulio described future juvenile offenders in compelling terms:
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On the horizon … are tens of thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile
super-predators. They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of
physical violence for the most trivial reasons (for example, a perception of slight
disrespect or the accident of being in their path). They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor
the pain of imprisonment. They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code
that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality. In prison or out,
the things that super-predators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money—are
their own immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them. So, for as long as their
youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes “naturally”: murder, rape, rob,
assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high. (p. 1)
The term “super predator” is often cited in the literature of this subject matter. Dilulio
(1995) articulated the concerns and suspicions of the public, legislators, and judicial leaders
which was that the current juveniles were different than those who had been granted social
protection in the past; that their violent behavior was so ingrained that they were beyond
rehabilitation and the public was safest when they were imprisoned.
It is with hindsight that observers of the political trend of that time period question the
strong bipartisan support that politicians lent to promoting the power of increased criminal
punishment across many spheres, deeply affecting the juvenile system of policing, prosecution,
and detention. In an article written for The Atlantic, author Peter Beinart (2015) reflected on the
common beliefs among legislators under the Clinton administration, highlighting the wide
acceptance of increased punishment and as well as the death penalty: “In 1994, Clinton’s crime
bill—which among other things, expanded the death penalty, encouraged states to lengthen
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prison sentences and eliminated federal funding for inmate education—garnered the votes of
every Democratic Senator except one” (p. 2).
Beinart was referring to President Clinton’s leadership in advancing the country’s most
comprehensive crime bill yet (U.S. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, n.d). The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 significantly increased funds for additional federal
law enforcement agencies, police officers, and prison construction. It supported more punitive
sentencing for drug and gang affiliated crimes, and endorsed harsher penalties for young
offenders. Importantly, this new law officially provided for the exclusion of the juvenile court
process for those charged with more serious offenses when it stated it “authorize[d] adult
prosecution of those 13 and older charged with certain violent crimes” (The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, 1994, p.1).
This law, which was the product of bipartisan input, is often cited as one of the most
powerful mechanisms for creating and populating prisons, often with minorities. Author
Michelle Alexander (2011) examined the strong evidence of an emergence in the 1990s of “a
new racial caste system,” which ultimately manifested in “mass incarceration” of African
Americans. This influx of convictions was due in part to Democratic attempts to draw support
from “swing voters.” Their pledges to “get tough on crime” were meant to appeal to voters who
perceived the new rights afforded to African Americans by the Civil Rights movement as,
“require[ing] real sacrifices on the part of white Americans” (Alexander, 2011, p. 55).
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a research report called The State
Responses to Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime. The report claimed that since the 1992
legislative sessions regarding juvenile justice issues, only two other moments in the past 100
years of U.S. history have had greater impact for delinquents: (a) the creation of the juvenile
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court system itself; and (b) the Gault decision that gave juveniles the same due process rights as
adults. The concerns of the 1990s involved the “escalating juvenile arrests for violent crime and
public perception of a violent juvenile crime epidemic” (U.S. Department of Justice. 1996, p. xi).
The response to these concerns were outlined in significant changes in state laws that
tended to blur the lines of the juvenile and criminal courts in several ways. In general, the states
were more likely to transfer juvenile cases to criminal court. For example, some states modified
the waiver requirements laid out in Kent: “11 states lowered the age limit for one or more
offenses, 10 states added crimes, and 2 states added prior record provisions” ((U.S. Department
of Justice. 1996, p. 4). Some states added “presumptive waivers,” which burdened the young
defendant to prove he or she was amenable to treatment offered in a juvenile detention setting in
order to avoid the adult system.
Summary: Just Desserts
From the early 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century, one can observe a palpable
fear based on a perceived increase in juvenile crime. The overwhelming response to this concern
was to dismantle the privileges adolescent defendants were granted in favor of placing more
power in the hands of law enforcement, i.e., police officers and prosecutors. This response also
led to an increase in numbers of juvenile court cases formally processed through the adult system
and a decline in rehabilitation services offered. However, as more forensic research was
conducted, criticism of the data used to mandate the changes that blurred the lines between
juveniles and adults in the criminal justice system began to emerge. Furthermore, the revelation
of brain development research highlighted differences in levels of culpability between teenagers
and adults and indicated the adolescent’s responsivity to rehabilitation. The addition of this new
information led policy makers to review their “just desserts” stance.

31
A Return to Protection
Researchers Voice Concern Over Trend to Strip Juvenile Protections
J.J. Shook (2005) not only reiterated Foucault’s belief about the increasingly oppressive
forces operating within today’s penal system, but explored specifically how this stance affects
juveniles in prison. What was once taken for granted, in his view, is that the juvenile court
system treated youth as separate:
From adults, with special needs and vulnerabilities, and [that] its widespread
implementation served to further crystallize and shape these shifting notions. In this way,
the development of the juvenile court established a distinctive boundary between the
worlds of juveniles and adults (Shook, 2005, p. 468).
Shook (2005) went on to highlight a growing concern about how juveniles in the criminal system
are treated. Though juveniles were once considered vulnerable due to developmental immaturity,
resulting in less capacity to form criminal intentions, that paradigm is changing. Over the last
several decades, juveniles had increasingly been sentenced in the United States as adults and not
afforded the opportunity to reform once they were imprisoned.
Public Opinion and Sentencing
In research that sought to measure public opinion about the death penalty for juveniles,
Vogel and Vogel (2003) asserted that the country had developed a growing tendency to “get
tough” on crime in sentencing practices. Data collected from public opinion polls between 1985
and 2000 showed that most Americans (66–80%) agreed when presented with the question of
whether capital punishment was the best dispositional outcome for the crime of murder.
However, when the option of life without parole was included as an alternative, fewer
respondents favored the death penalty (50–61%; Gallup Poll Organization, 2000).
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Robert M. Bohm (1991) analyzed Gallup Poll data obtained from 1936 to 1986 by
respondents’ socioeconomic background. He surmised, “Whites, wealthier individuals,
westerners, Republicans, and males” supported the death penalty more often than did other
segments of the population (as cited in Vogel & Vogel, 2003, p. 171). The 1991 numbers showed
a shift for “wealthier” and “westerner” responses toward decreased favor for capital punishment.
Studies conducted on public opinion concerning juveniles and death penalty revealed that
respondents are less likely to endorse a death penalty sentence for a juvenile than for an adult.
For example, Moon et al. (2000) found that 80% of participants chose the death penalty for
adults. Fifty-three percent of the same group favored the same sentence for adolescents. In a
separate study, Cullen et al. (2000) concluded that public opinion displayed a bias toward harsh
sentences for young offenders; however, once mitigating factors were presented for
consideration, sentencing tended to be more lenient.
Vogel and Vogel (2003) stated that the criminal justice system appeared to be divided into
dichotomous pathways regarding adolescent offenders. On the one hand, for decades, public
opinion and the majority of the legislation passed reflected a tendency to punish more harshly in
general, perceiving juveniles less as wards of the state, and thus to be sentenced increasingly as
adults. Simultaneously, studies of brain development conducted in the 1990s and early 2000s
presented evidence that juvenile behavior is affected by brain development in a way that would
make offenders more likely to commit crimes than an adult. Among the conclusions drawn based
on empirical analyses are the following: juveniles are more impulsive than adults (Grisso, 1996);
they have less ability to foresee the consequences of their actions (Gardner & Herman, 1990);
and they take risks and succumb to peer pressure more often than do adults (Reppucci, 1999).
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Contextual Factors Considered
Steinberg and Scott (2003) were similarly concerned about the increasingly punitive
sentences being handed down to juveniles for both egregious crimes, such as killing, and much
lesser ones. They pointed to the invocation of the death penalty for juveniles and the detention of
juveniles in adult facilities as important issues for public discourse. They also highlighted the
irony in its concurrence with the emerging science that indicated that the juvenile brain functions
differently than the adult brain, thus raising the question as to whether juveniles are as “culpable”
and appropriately considered in sentencing decisions. Essential to understanding the authors’
viewpoint was the distinction they drew between “excuse” and “mitigation” in legal proceedings:
“Unlike excuse, which calls for a binary judgment … mitigation places the culpability of a guilty
actor somewhere on a continuum of criminal culpability and, by extension, a continuum of
punishment” (Steinberg & Scott, 2003, p. 1010).
Three specific areas to be considered in mitigation include: (a) factors that influence
capacity, such as cognitive or mental impairments (Kadish, 1987; Steinberg & Scott, 2003); (b)
behavior that can be weighed against the way a “reasonable” individual would act given a similar
situation (Morse, 1994; Steinberg & Scott, 2003); and (c) information that implies that the
criminal behavior was “out of character” for the defendant and suggests that the defendant was
otherwise productive and respectful of the rule of law (Steinberg & Scott, 2003, p. 1011). The
conclusion drawn by the authors is that socially just rulings would consider the contextual factors
of individual defendants while sentencing.
Compared: The Cognitive Abilities of Juveniles and the Intellectually Impaired
In 2005’s federal court case, Roper v. Simmons, the influence of brain development
research was reflected in arguments against the death sentence for minors, specifically for
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17-year-old Christopher Simmons. The facts allege that he and two peers broke into the home of
the victim. When found, Simmons reportedly recognized her from a previous car accident and
decided at that point to murder her. The three teens bound her hands, taped over her eyes and
mouth, and threw her into a river where she drowned. Among the charges laid were kidnapping,
burglary, and murder in the first degree, for which the state sought the death penalty. As
Simmons was 17 years old at the time of the crime, his counsel raised his age as an important
mitigating factor when considering capital punishment. Nonetheless, Simmons was ultimately
found guilty and sentenced to death.
A new attorney was assigned the Simmons case and attempted to obtain post-conviction
relief, mainly based on the grounds of ineffective counsel. New testimony included statements
from a psychologist who had evaluated him as well as from his friends and neighbors. This new
picture presented revealed the defendant as “very immature,” “very impulsive,” and “very
susceptible to being manipulated or influenced” (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, section 558). Despite
this argument, the Missouri State Supreme Court ultimately denied post-conviction relief.
This case again grabbed the attention of the State Supreme Court after it had been
established in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) that death sentences were unconstitutional for
intellectually impaired individuals because they violated Eighth Amendment protections. Based
on this new federal precedent, the Missouri State Supreme Court agreed to reverse his death
sentence.
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion denying the Petitioner’s request to reverse the
latest Missouri Supreme Court decision to relieve Simmons of his death sentence. He reiterated
Missouri’s reasoning in light of the decision reached in the Atkins case:
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The objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death
penalty in the majority of the States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on
the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—provide
sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles in the words Atkins used
respecting the mentally retarded as “categorically less culpable than the average
criminal.” (section 567; Atkins v. Virginia,536 U.S., section 316)
The decision in this case highlighted issues of cognitive deficiencies in sentencing by equating
the culpability levels of the intellectually impaired and juvenile offenders.
“Twice Diminished Culpability”
In another case, SCOTUS (Graham v. Florida, 2010) reviewed the issue of whether a
minor could be held as responsible as an adult for a crime, and therefore sentenced as such. The
crime under review involved 17-year-old Terrance Jamar Graham who was on probation for
convictions of armed burglary and assault when he was charged with two separate robberies on
the same night. That evening, he had two teenaged accomplices with him. During the second
robbery, one of his accomplices was shot. Graham drove him to the hospital and dropped him
off. When he attempted to drive away, he was approached by police. Instead of stopping for the
officer, he sped away, drove his car into a telephone pole, and was caught by police when he
tried to run away. Graham was subsequently charged and found guilty of armed robbery and
attempted armed robbery on that night. Graham’s sentence of life without parole was the
maximum possible. The trial judge justified the sentencing decision as such:
Given your escalating pattern of criminal conduct, it is apparent to the Court that you
have decided that this is the way you are going to live your life and … the only thing I
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can do now is try and protect the community from your actions. (Graham v. Florida,
2010, section 2020)
Justice Kennedy delivered SCOTUS’ opinion, which denied the lower court’s ruling to
sentence a juvenile to life-without-parole for a non-homicidal crime, by referring to the same
reasoning offered in the Roper case (Roper v. Simmons, 2005) which spoke of culpability and
severity of punishment:
As petitioner’s amici papers written in support of his position by interested parties
outside the lawsuit point out, development in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds … Juveniles are more
capable of change than are adults ... It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer,
a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral
culpability. (Roper v. Simmons, 2005, section 2027)
This SCOTUS decision further revealed an increasing importance placed upon the consideration
of the mitigating and rehabilitation factors in juvenile criminal cases.
A Link Between Psychiatric Disorders and Prison
King et al. (2011) contended that a sample of juveniles residing in juvenile detention
centers had suffered from many mental disorders before being admitted. The mental disorders
seemed to correlate with a history of mental, physical, and sexual abuse experienced in
childhood. Most detainees were noted to suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), substance abuse, disruptive disorders, and anxiety. Ng et al. (2011) asserted that
incarceration caused greater depression among juvenile inmates sentenced to adult facilities than
among those in juvenile centers, which raises questions about the services offered in one
environment versus the other. The authors also posited that the separation perceived by inmates
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assigned to the adult system is internalized by those inmates, giving them a sense that their
crimes were worse than those who were not sent into the adult system, and that they suffer more
mentally and emotionally as a result.
Criteria for Life Without Parole Sentences Limited
In 2003, Evan Miller was 14 years old when he was charged with killing his neighbor.
The facts of this Federal Supreme Court case were presented as the following: Miller and a
friend were at his home when a neighbor came by to make a drug deal with Miller’s mother. The
two boys went back to the neighbor’s house and smoked marijuana with him. After the neighbor
fell asleep, Miller went through his wallet and took money out of it. When he tried to put it back,
the neighbor woke and “grabbed him by the throat” (Miller v. Alabama, 2012, section 2462).
Miller’s friend struck the victim with a baseball bat and Miller took the bat and beat him more.
The two boys then left the neighbor in his home while they lit fire to it. The victim died of smoke
inhalation and injuries. Miller was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
SCOTUS voted to overturn the sentence. Justice Kagan offered the following argument in
support of its position:
[T]he mandatory penalty schemes at issue here prevent the sentence from taking account
of these central considerations. By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a
juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these laws
prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s harshest term of
imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. (Miller v. Alabama, 2012,
section 2466)
The decision in this case not only restricted life-without-parole sentencing for juveniles, it
highlighted a perceived need to integrate individualized factors while weighing dispositional
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options. SCOTUS’s position distanced itself from the mandatory sentencing practices used since
the 1970s for juveniles.
2014 Washington State Senate Bill 5064
Washington State Senate Bill 5064 was passed in February 2014 in direct response to the
SCOTUS Miller v. Alabama decision of 2012 which held that juveniles being sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole or release violated the Constitution’s Eighth
Amendment forbidding cruel and unusual punishment (as cited in Senate Bill 5064, 2014).
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CHAPTER III: METHODS
Project Purpose
This project examined the lived experience of Washington State juvenile justice
policymakers and activists navigating complex, shifting juvenile sentencing laws in the adult
court system since the Miller v. Alabama (2012) landmark case. During a doctoral course in
qualitative research, I was engaged in a group project that set out to study the lived experiences
of individuals who gave testimony during the presentation of Washington State’s Senate Bill
5064 to the State Senate. The purpose of this bill was to create compliance with the changes in
federal law mandated by the federal supreme court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama of 2012
(Senate Bill Report 2SSB-5064). The legal changes mandated by this ruling involved topics that
provoked curiosity. The group was particularly interested in the investigation because of its focus
on issues related to social justice, brain development science, and therapeutic treatment. By
studying the experiences of those who testified on behalf of the state’s adaptation of the Federal
Supreme Court ruling, the group gained rich insight into the human experience of advocating for
juveniles. To that end, the group chose a Descriptive Phenomenological research design. It is a
qualitative method used in psychological research and will be further discussed below (Creswell,
2014). The information sought from the study’s participants focused on their shared experience
about what it meant to be involved in the formulation of new legislation that had the potential of
significantly changing the life course of many juvenile offenders.
Qualitative Research Design
In describing the difference between qualitative and quantitative studies, Creswell (2014)
stated that qualitative studies were a “a way of looking at research that honors an inductive style,
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a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation” (p.
4). To that end, I endeavored to treat the historical background of sentencing in juvenile criminal
matters with a focus on data to reveal the unique experiences of the selected participants. By
choosing a phenomenological design, I hoped to delve more deeply into individual experiences
than a quantitative study allowed. Such a design also required the investigator to allow
discovered themes to guide the study and subsequent report, and not the other way around.
Moustakas’ (1994) approach to phenomenological studies involves the following ideas:
1. Choice of a procedure that highlights a shared experience;
2. Bracketing bias by recording the lived experience of the investigators on their chosen
topic;
3. Collection of data through interviews;
4. Selecting interview questions that are open-ended;
5. Coding themes and significant statements from the data.
These steps call for an attitude of receptivity to knowledge, which is not presumed but is
discovered.
Phenomenology and Essence
It was with hope of advancing the discovery of truth that the philosopher Edmund
Husserl put forth the idea of a new investigative approach (Moules et al., 2015). His intention
was not to debunk popular methodologies driven by “scientism” or that which is revealed
through purely empirical research, but to contribute a philosophical lens for arriving at
knowledge and truth. He asserted that through phenomenological reduction the research would
elucidate the essence of an experience, which he described as “an object of a new type. Just as
the datum of individual or empirical intuition is an individual object, so the datum of essential
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intuition is a pure essence” (Husserl, 1931/2012, p. 12). Husserl believed that this kind of
knowledge-gathering need not replace research derived from a scientific methodology. Instead,
such research would be enhanced by allowing the revelation of the essence to guide the way
toward increased understanding and, consequently, more studies, whether they be empirically or
phenomenologically-based. The rationale for choosing this methodology, which seeks to reveal
the human experience, is that it serves to complement research that relies on reductionism by
revealing information that cannot be considered within the realm of traditional scientific study.
Concepts offered by Amedeo Giorgi (2012), the creator of the Descriptive Phenomenological
research design, emphasized the importance of its addition to the field of psychology:
The spirit of science would be respected but it would be implemented with methods and
concepts different from the natural sciences because the subject matter—human persons
and relationships—had characteristics different from the object of natural
sciences—things and processes. (p. 4)
Giorgi’s Adaptation of Husserl’s Ideas
Giorgi (2009) took Husserl’s ideas about methodology as a guide when he developed the
descriptive phenomenological method. This approach, he asserted, “draws upon the intersection
of three intellectual movements: phenomenological philosophy, science and psychology”
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 1). He claimed that the field of psychology had been adjunctive to philosophy
in that its research methods drew upon those used in that discipline. At the close of the 19th
century, psychological investigation increasingly aligned itself with methodology used in the
natural sciences instead. Giorgi (2009) contended that the shift toward the natural sciences
advanced the field because “measurement processes have to be applied to the data; and some
kind of public verification has to be demonstrated” (p. x). However, sets of data collected and
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analyzed in this way “are not applicable to the full range of phenomena,” and, “consciousness is
the prime, but not only example. Memories, images, dreams, hallucinations, and the like
are…examples” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 3). Furthermore, Giorgi (2009) explained that his adapted
approach is “a method for investigating the structure of consciousness and the types of objects
that present themselves to consciousness” (p. 87). He strove to convert Husserl’s purely
philosophical approach to consciousness into a scientific one.
Bracketing
Giorgi (2009) upheld Husserl’s endorsement of bracketing, or the inclusion of statements
reflecting the investigator’s bias that could influence their findings. He claimed that, in addition
to omitting observation and analysis related to natural sciences, what makes the
phenomenological method distinctive is that the researcher presents information to the reader
about their own relevant experience pertaining to the subject being studied. The rationale behind
“bracketing is the notion that past knowledge about whatever is presently given is also put aside
so that unprejudiced attention can be directed to what is present in the current act of
consciousness being considered” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 10).
This Researcher’s Bias
I was born into a family of political activists. My parents were politically liberal and
believed that the dominant culture oppressed individuals with minority status. Both of my
parents opposed the Vietnam War, for example, and organized against it by protesting. I observed
my mother campaign for candidates in local elections. I remember her leaving me with friends
when I was young so that she could march in Washington, D.C. for the Equal Rights
Amendment. I became of age to vote on the day of the 1988 presidential election. My mother
accompanied me to the voting center and took me out afterward to celebrate my introduction to
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the election process. Political activism is, so to speak, in my blood. Therefore, I am interested in
what makes people decide to spend their personal and professional time advocating for change.
Additionally, I worked as an investigator for the public defenders’ office and witnessed the
effects that harsh sentencing practices had on my indigent clients. I am, therefore, sensitive to the
suffering caused by what I considered a system of disproportionate treatment for people who
lived in poverty, both adults and juveniles. To be clear: my professional experiences have
influenced me in such a way as to reject the notion of sentencing juveniles as adults.
Procedure
The procedure of this project involved several steps. First, the investigator completed an
Internal Review Board (IRB) application. In it, ethical issues related to conducting the research
were outlined.
When the interviews were conducted, I met with each participant at an agreed upon
location and time, and provided a private and professional interview environment. The proposed
meeting forum was a reserved classroom at the Antioch University Seattle campus or at the
participant’s office. Due to restrictions mandated to isolate during the pandemic of 2020, most of
the interviews were conducted over the phone.
The Interviews
Interviews within the descriptive phenomenological framework were open-ended,
exploratory (Giorgi, 2009). Appendix A shows the list of questions asked to each participant.
This style of questioning sought to discern if the participant is “revealing an aspect of how he or
she was present in the situation,” which was the desired data in descriptive phenomenological
research (Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). Giorgi (2009) also contended that this can be a difficult task
when a participant digresses from the question being asked. During these moments, the
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interviewer is encouraged to “use common sense” and direct the conversation back to the topic
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 122). The focus of the interviews were to learn about aspects of the individuals’
experience that have influenced their advocacy in legislation for adolescents in the adult judicial
system.
Participants
Pursuant to Creswell’s (2013) description of phenomenological research design and
recommendations for sound methodology, the selected six participants were found on the list of
those who testified for Washington State Senate Bill 5064. I searched for their contact
information through the internet and sent an email with a request for an interview. If I did not
manage to contact them through email, I called their offices.
It is important to note that only two participants returned their demographics information
forms. I speculated the reasoning being that information it provided may have decreased the
ability to remain anonymous. Because the group of participants was so small and, indeed, is the
“world” they inhabit politically and professionally, omitting personal information may have been
motivated by prudence.
Exclusion criteria. Individuals who were listed in the bill but did not testify were
excluded from this study.
All available contextual information provided about the listed individuals such as their
respective agencies of employment, their positions, status and rank within their agencies, and
how they voted in response to the Bill’s various elements were taken into consideration by the
investigator during participant selection. Specifically, the proposed participants were adults who
in 2013 and 2014 presented their opinions to the Washington State Senate about the focus of the
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new state law that would reform sentencing guidelines for juveniles who were previously
considered for life-without-parole sentences.
Participant selection. Once potential participants were chosen and contacted, they were
asked to volunteer their time without any possibility of compensation. Each participant was
asked to fill out a demographic information form as well (see Appendix C). The participants
were contacted by phone and email. They were also sent a confidentiality form (see Appendix
B).
Recruitment. The professional contact information for all participants was available
online. There was slight variation in terms of how they could be reached (e.g., phone, email, or
via administrative assistant), and how long it would take to get in contact and obtain a verbal
agreement to participate. I informed my respective participants they were personally selected for
interviews about their experience testifying for Senate Bill 5064. I identified myself as a clinical
psychology doctoral student at Antioch University Seattle, and stated that the interviews were
being requested as part of a dissertation research study. The participants were informed that the
purpose was to explore the lived experience of legal professionals and/or juvenile justice
advocates who were involved in the passage of Senate Bill 5064. The prospective interviews
were described in terms of their open-ended, exploratory style, and personal information about
their experience was requested. All six participants were given time to consider participating in
an interview after all preliminary information about the nature and purpose of the research study
was provided. Such information included the researchers’ declarations that participation was
voluntary and not subject to compensation of any kind as well as that confidentiality would be
protected throughout the study.
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Confidentiality. Each participant was given a confidentiality and consent form to sign. It
included an outline of the study’s plans for managing the issues of confidentiality. The
participants and the interviewer both filled in the two signature lines on the consent form (see
Appendix B). One signature line was meant to ensure protection of interview information while
the other is to provide consent to be audio recorded. The investigator stated her agreement to
disallow identifiable information from any and all written reports about the research. These
included written submissions and subsequent edits as intended for professional publication. The
interviews (recordings and transcripts) and related materials were stored on encrypted computers.
Risks. Because the chosen participants had already testified in open court proceedings
about their opinions and beliefs on the topic, it was believed the anonymous and individual
discussion forum of this research would be less stressful, albeit difficult to discuss emotions tied
to the experience of having advocated for juveniles. To mitigate any such potential issues,
questions were sent to interviewees in advance of the interview. By doing so, the investigator
aimed to spare participants the experience of being surprised by what is being asked as well as to
give them each a chance to mentally and emotionally process their feelings before discussing the
experience.
Benefits. This research would add to the fields of psychology and law by illuminating the
history of juvenile legal regulations and the shared experience of those who advocated for reform
within the juvenile criminal justice system. More specifically, this study would enhance the
fields’ understandings of the experience of those who were involved in the development of
important policy changes that affected a vulnerable population.
Protections. The rights of the participants were soundly protected by measures taken to
guard their anonymity. All identifying information about each participant was anonymized and
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coded with a participant number. Only the investigator had the participant number coding list. It
was kept confidential and password protected on the researcher’s computer. Each participant was
informed of their right to ask that particular pieces of shared information not be incorporated into
the research and analysis.
Additionally, each participant was provided an informed consent document (see
Appendix B). To protect the participants’ signatures, paper copies of the informed consent forms
were stored in a locked file cabinet. The informed consent form included information on the
intent to use audio recording equipment while interviewing, and required a separate signature.
Steps to the Descriptive Method
Data Collection
As stated earlier, according to the precepts of the descriptive method, Giorgi (2009)
stated, “what one seeks from a research interview … is as complete a description as possible” (p.
x) about the phenomenon experienced. The investigator needs to inquire about the impressions of
the specific set of circumstances the participants encountered. If the assessment is that he or she
has not, the researcher will need to steer the interview toward this theme. The interview itself
should also be as long as needed in order to capture the experience, but should not go beyond
this point because “a sense of proportion relative to the phenomenon being studied is required”
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 124).
Transcription
Each interview was recorded on two separate recording devices. The second device was
used as a back-up in the event one malfunctioned. One copy of the interview was downloaded on
to the investigator’s encrypted computer. The other copy of the interview was deleted. The
interviews were transcribed using Microsoft Word by the researcher. Again, participants were
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identified by a code in order to ensure confidentiality. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was used to
create the notations required in descriptive phenomenological design (explained below).
Data Analysis
The underlying goal of data analysis in Giorgi’s (2009) descriptive method is to label
what appears on the surface to the investigator. It does not ask for the researcher to address
“ambiguities.” The idea is to provide descriptions from data in which information is “given” and
does not warrant a perspective that strives to interpret meaning (Giorgi, 2009, p. 127).
Reading for a Sense of the Whole
The first step in analyzing the data came through transcribing the interview recordings.
The researcher then reads through the transcribed text. The goal at this stage was to “be sensitive
to the implications of the data for the phenomenon being researched” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 128). The
first read should not provide an established sense of the whole description; this is expected to
happen later on in the process. Instead, it is seen as an opportunity to peer at the data to “get a
sense of the whole while sensitively discriminating the intentional objects of the lifeworld
description provided by the participant” (Giorgi, 2009, pp. 128–129). This was how the
investigator began to arrive at the description using the lens of phenomenological scientific
reduction.
Determination of Meaning Units
According to Giorgi (2009), the next step was to read the transcribed interview again in
order to separate descriptions into “parts.” Each of these “meaning units” were studied for the
presence of psychological meaning and not for grammatical meaning per se. The information
drawn also reflected the phenomenon being studied. The investigator chose what constitutes
meaning units, making them subject to “the psychological sensitivity that the researcher brings to
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the task” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 130). Some authors argue that this dynamic creates subjectivity.
Giorgi contended, however, that this lack of objectivity does not “carry … theoretical weight”
since the next step involves addressing the “transformation” of the parts and that provides the
descriptions with significant meaning. At this point, the researcher reread the interview
transcripts, noting descriptions and passages where “a significant shift in meaning” occurs
(Giorgi, 2009, p. 130). Herein lay the production of meaning units.
Transformation of Participant’s Natural Attitudinal Expressions Into
Phenomenologically-Sensitive Expressions
In this next step, the objective was to read through the interview transcript again with the
intention of transforming meaning units into “structures” that further refine “the psychological
dimension of experience” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 131). Giorgi claimed that, in order to label these parts
using the phenomenological descriptive method, the investigator would approach the raw data
with a psychological mindset. In other words, in order to adopt this lens, the researcher seeks
information that reveals psychological significance and would label the expressions that did so,
just as a descriptive study involving mathematical concepts would highlight data with
mathematical significance and would require a “mathematical attitude” (p. 131).
Giorgi (2009) asserted the steps taken in the transformation of meaning units assure a
measure of validity: “the results of the descriptive approach imply strong knowledge claims
because the results include descriptions of findings rather than theories or hypotheses;”
furthermore, “the second-order descriptions that constitute structures have the strength of facts”
(p. 131). Since the data pulled was based on information that was taken at face value, Giorgi
argued that it is more valid than information based on conjecture, as in, for example, an
interpretive design. For further proof of validity, Giorgi instructed the researcher to cross-check

50
the noted transformed meaning units with the “critical other” to ensure an acceptance of the
newly labeled structure (p. 131).
As stated earlier, the meaning units were considered within a psychological framework.
Giorgi (2009) stated, “The researcher is reading the participant’s description, but within the
reduction he or she awakens the phenomenal characteristics of the description, which in turn
makes the senses of the described experiences more available” (p. 133). The technique for
discerning meaning units involved a “procedure of free imaginative variation” in which the
investigator searched for an “invariant sense” among descriptions. The aim was to note the
invariant sense and “test” it by returning to the particular data part and reconsider whether it
captures the phenomenological psychological essence that adds “to the total structure” of what is
being studied (Giorgi, 2009, p. 133). This was the meaning of transformation in this context, and
it was carried through until each description was so developed.
Reliability
Golafshani (2003) asserted reliability in quantitative and qualitative studies is measured
differently. While the worth of a quantitative study is tied to the ability to produce a study that
yields similar results when reproduced, a qualitative study’s reliability rests in the
“trustworthiness” of the researcher’s method (p. 601). While quantitative studies aim to reveal
concrete ideas relating to “causal determination, prediction, and generalization of findings,” the
qualitative investigation strives to contribute “illumination, understanding, and extrapolation to
similar situations” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 600). However, he contended, qualitative studies ought
to follow the tenets of a quantitative study insofar as they uphold the necessary “trustworthiness,
rigor and quality” required to “eliminate bias and increase the researcher’s truthfulness of a
proposition about some social phenomenon” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). It is critical that the
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researcher conduct the study with these goals in mind because, unlike in a quantitative study,
there are no measurement data to support a study’s results. Indeed, the primary tool in qualitative
work is the researcher herself (Patton, 2002). It is important to note that in a descriptive
phenomenological design, the researcher is required to limit their bias and to invite feedback
from other researchers about findings, which makes this particular qualitative design more
objective than others (Giorgio, 2009). In this case, the researcher did not approach the data with
her own prior impressions in mind and invited feedback from others about her analysis. These
measures support research that approaches objectivity and were performed in this study.
There is a specific mindset the investigator should apply toward the crucial matter of
trustworthiness that makes the investigative design hold up to scientific standards, to the extent
that a qualitative study can (Golafshani, 2003). I applied diligent effort toward maintaining
“neutrality” (p. 601) by bracketing my prior experiences and impressions of the subject matter. I
strove to bracket during interactions with participants. For example, by conducting the interviews
with an openness to the information offered, I limited interference from my preconceived ideas
and biases. I practiced “consistency” by following the same procedural guidelines for all
participants at every step (p. 601). They were recruited and interviewed in the manner described
earlier. Each interview transcript was read through and noted using the same psychological
mindset and computer programs. And I practiced “transferability” (Golafshani, 2003, p. 601) by
generating data results that were easy to explain to the “critical other” (Giorgi, 2009, p. 128).
When closely following the tenets of the above method, the rationale behind labeling the data all
along the way is made clear to readers.

Generalizability
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Maxwell (1992) contended that generalizability is not necessarily an achievable goal for
the qualitative study. In this particular study, for example, the results will not have applicability
to individuals outside of this investigation. The participants chosen for this study were present
for the argument of a bill in the Washington State Senate to provide opinions that were unique to
them. These opinions were shaped by experiences that developed over a specific time period and
for different personal and professional purposes (for example, one may be a defense lawyer
whereas another may be a parole officer). Therefore, generalizability to a larger group is limited.
However, Giorgi (2009) argued that, when using the descriptive phenomenological method, the
shared phenomena highlighted by one group of similar makeup should apply to another. In this
case, for example, if I was to examine the shared experiences of advocates who testified in
another state’s legislative process to comply with the decision handed down in Miller v. Alabama
(2012), my study would, arguably, yield similar results.
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS
After gathering and analyzing the data from six interviews obtained from those who
testified for Bill 5064, essential psychological meanings were derived. The data uncovered nine
such meanings according to Giorgi’s (2009) Descriptive Phenomenology. The meanings are
listed below:
1. Influence. Participants expressed desire or obligation to influence the process.

2. Culpability. The culpability of the adolescent was considered a factor in formulating
new sentencing guidelines.

3. Science. The latest developmental brain science shaped the new law.

4. Compromise and negotiation. Participants used compromise and negotiation ultimately
as means to advancing their own interests.

5. Individual Rights. Considering individual rights was important in developing the new
policy.

6. Public Safety. Public safety concerns were valued.

7. Vulnerability. Adolescents were regarded as developmentally vulnerable. Some sought
to sentence and detain them separately from adults.

8. Rehabilitation. Adolescents were viewed as capable of rehabilitation and worthy of the
opportunity while detained.

9. Collaboration. Collaboration between all sides was considered a key element in passing
the new law.
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION
Through using Giorgi’s (2009) descriptive method, the researcher recognized eight
essential meanings, which were parsed after following the required steps mentioned earlier in
this paper. They are briefly listed and described below.
Influence
Participants were motivated to testify for the bill formation because they had a
professional obligation to do so, were personally motivated based on a value system, or a
combination of both.
For P2, it was essential that their influence was as accurate a reflection as possible of
those for whom they represented during the process:
It was really within my role as the legislative co-chair of the association of prosecutors.
Because it was bill of high interest to prosecutors that was part of my role was to be a
communicator to the legislature about what the association’s viewpoint was. When we
work internally, we have a discussion and try to be in a place where there are certain
points where we can be in consensus and be on point and then that is the message that
gets conveyed to the legislature so my role is to do that but to do that without getting
astray and into saying things and making statements that the group hadn’t endorsed.
P3 regarded their influence as important in that the imprint they wanted to make on the
final bill was, ultimately, largely actualized. Additionally, the final bill has proven to be effective:
We had a legislative agenda every year to follow and then we respond to the bills that
come for about five other entities. In 5064, we had a draft of the main points that we
wanted to see preserved and we went into it knowing that the legislature probably would
not just rubber stamp what we had. They would want to make it their own. So, we went
in expecting it to be changed. But, actually, I was very gratified that the bill came out
fairly close to what we suggested at the beginning. I put it on my resume as one of my
most significant legislative accomplishments because we were kind of out on the edge
there in terms of trying to participate, what the pressures would be and how to best
respond to them. And I have to say that I’m not in the business anymore but my
understanding is that the system that has been put in place since 5064 is working pretty
well.
P5 believed their influence offered a crucial voice because they were once in a position of
the kind of vulnerability that was not being represented during the process:
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I always prepared my own testimony because the lawyer was going to do their job based
on their research. All the experts who’ve not been to prison will get up there and talk
about what they don’t know. I just find that it is more authentic if it just came from me
because I truly lived in this world of prison. And I just don’t think that anybody else
would be able to have it come across the way I want it if someone else wrote it.
P5 also expressed doubt that their influence was being considered, mainly because they
were not certain their testimony was noted:
I guess there’s a – if they were listening, then my effectiveness would be great, I think.
But I can’t tell you how many times I’ve traveled to Olympia to testify and there’s only
one person sitting there or by the time it comes to some kind of criminal justice matter to
be talked about the whole panel leaves that was already there. There were other people
there for the hearing prior to us and one person stays and then they say “Oh, this will be
recorded. Don’t worry, they’ll watch it.” I’ve been told that so many times. It’s a little
frustrating. If they’re there or they’re watching the video and listening, I think it would be
effective.
P6 acknowledged the influence of other individuals and agencies as bearing more weight
on the process than their own:
I don’t know if it’s possible to evaluate the effectiveness of my sole influence on the bill
or -----------‘s influence on the bill just because there were a coalition of juvenile justice
advocates that were really pushing for what ended up being the final product. And I think
that collective influence was very effective. It could have easily been the case that the
WAPO bill, as introduced, where I think it was talking about a 35-year minimum, where I
don’t think it was separated out by age, could have been in place. And so having the
CLS’s, the WDA’s, the ACLU’s of the world working, and the individuals–we can’t
forget them – who were either subject to long sentences for offenses they committed
while they were under 18 or shortly thereafter–I think contributed strongly to the
effectiveness of 5064.
Culpability
Some of the individuals interviewed discussed the issue of culpability among young
offenders as a factor in forming the new law. Whether their immaturity warranted a more lenient
treatment than adults was at question. P1 believed youth are less deserving of punishment than
adults. Furthermore, individuals in this society are either more or less likely to be punished based
on cultural biases:
And the question that really made people stop and think is are you the same person you
were 20 years ago? Twenty years ago could you imagine sitting in that chair doing
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this? . . . Other than the fact that I raised a kid. I saw her. I saw her friends. I was a kid. I
don’t think I’d go as far as the president when he visited a prison said but there’s a lot of
part of the reason I got caught up in the prison system is a I never got caught. I think a lot
of us are like that. Some of that comes from white privilege. Some of that was just dumb
luck. I cannot accurately describe that. There are very few people who had been given a
bad twist of fate would not have been caught up, especially the juvenile justice system.
P2 noted that there are opposing views on when an individual should be considered
culpable:
And then you end up with the debate of the science here, and then philosophy and debate
over at what point do we start holding people accountable for their actions in a
punishment way? Where does that line exist? And prosecutors are wrestling with that.
There’s a good cohort of mine that would say, “it’s 21 to do everything else, you know.
You’re getting all the privileges of 21, then they’ve got to accept the accountability.” And
they’re just fine with the system as it is. And there’s a few others that recognize that there
are differences.
P6 expressed disagreement that older adolescents should still qualify to serve a life
sentence:
So, that was one of the things I know we were concerned about is that is still allowed for
life without parole for those who were 16 or 17 at the time of their offense. We testified
to that, to all of our concerns. I think there might have been some concerns being set at 25
years. So that was another one.
P6 also noted the subsequent court cases that further addressed issues of adolescent
culpability:
The Houston-Sconiers decision, The Odell decision, The Bassett decision, all have been
positive steps forward for having kids are different than adults for the purposes of
sentencing. They’re not as culpable for their actions, even though those offenses may be
similar, you cannot punish a kid in the same way you would as an adult.
Related Literature
Scott et al. (2006) focused on views on whether juveniles are culpable. Their findings
reflected that participants generally viewed adolescents as “influenced by their developmental
immaturity” and deserving of punishment and sentencing with that in mind, “even those who
commit serious crimes” (p. 18). They tended to believe that young offenders should be processed
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through a juvenile court system and separated from adults. These findings contradicted the
reasoning inherent in criminal justice policy trends of the time. Participants in this research
tended to consider the culpability of young offenders while creating the new sentencing
legislation.
Science
The emergence of brain development research highlighted a different maturity trajectory
than had been taken for granted in the criminal justice system at that point. The results of these
scientific studies implied the brain was fully developed much later than was believed. The
interviewed participants here often cited this new understanding and considered it while
formulating the new law.
P1 reflected on their understanding of American and European criminal justice systems
with scientific research in mind:
From what I’ve read, yes, they’re much more science based in doing what they do. They
have lower recidivism rates. They have a lot different prison conditions than we have. We
have more different than most Western European countries. And you don’t get radically
different results after 15 or 20 years. I mean somebody you’ve helped 20 years versus
somebody you’ve helped 30 years, I don’t know that there is a radically different result
when you let them out of the prison door.
P3 commented on the significant impact brain science on sentencing outcomes for older
detainees:
The issues regarding brain development are pretty much front and center in pretty much
every discussion in juvenile justice and last session, you may know, there was an
extension of the authority of juvenile rehabilitation authority to the age of 25 for young
people who are committed as adults before the age of 18 and I think after that age of 18
now. I’m not sure. So, that’s where it’s going. And I have some concerns, uh, the brain
science is clear it says definitively, in a general population, there are going to be young
people whose brains do not fully develop until the age of 26, or thereabouts, the question
is whether that means we should extend juvenile jurisdiction all the way to 26 or whether
we should keep the current demarcation of 18 and that has been I think, particularly with
the passage of the bill that passed last year extending jurisdiction to 25, that’s been kind
of accepted now. The discussion is going forward, how much and how far to extend that.
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P6 reflected on the damage done in the past to individuals who were sentenced before
brain science was available and considered, particularly to the marginalized:
And going back even further, when you are talking about “tough on crime” when you’re
talking about myths associated with Superpredators, when you are talking about the
disproportionate impact that those policies have had on kids and community of color—to
start rolling back on some of that stuff and to begin policies that are based on evidence
rather than based on, often times, on myths, that are grounded in racism and classism, is,
I think is helpful for our state and for the kids that are subject to this stuff.
Related Literature
The participants in this study often brought up the importance of evidence from
developmental brain science. Steinberg (2012) stated its relevance in the formulation of public
policy specifically:
There is now incontrovertible evidence that adolescence is a period of significant changes
in brain structure and function . . . And the most important conclusion to emerge from
recent research is that important changes in the brain anatomy and activity take place far
longer into development than had previously been thought. Reasonable people may
disagree about what these findings may mean as a society decides how to treat young
people, but there is little room for disagreement about the fact that adolescence is a period
of substantial brain maturation with respect to both structure and function. (p. 67)
This research elucidated an understanding in the field of psychology that some of the
current systems being used to process adjudicated juveniles were not serving society’s
wellbeing as a whole, particularly ones that assumed young people were suitable for adult
sentencing schemes.

Compromise and Negotiation
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The individuals interviewed in this study commonly remarked on the significance of
giving up some of what they wanted in return for achieving partial agreement with those who
opposed their positions. P1 observed that those who held opposing opinions to theirs were
willing to acquiesce over whether the bill should cover those who had been sentenced before the
new law went into effect:
It was clear that courts across the country come down on different sides of that question.
Some said yes it was retro, some said no. I think the prosecutors here felt they might have
been in a weak position. I don’t know if you’re talking to people on the prosecution side,
but they were the ones who brought to the table to make it retroactive, to make it, I
believe, 27 at the time, who had been sentenced with life without. It was something they
were willing to give in exchange for keeping the possibility of keeping life without, okay.
It was a chip.
P1 also noted what they needed to give up in order to reach consensus with the other side
and what they received in return:
They were tenaciously hanging on to the idea that life without could be a discretionary
sentence based on the individualized determination which was the phrasing used in
Miller. That each kid needs to have an individualized determination. But they wanted that
option to still be there for the judge. And in return, because their bill had been pretty
much stymied the year before by a group of us, they came back with a better position that
answered some of our concerns. Would I have liked to see life without go away in its
entirety? Yes. But for agreeing to allow to that to continue as a discretionary sentence, not
only did we get retroactive review, we got review of everybody at 25 with aggravated
first but any kid who was sentenced to anything other than aggravated first that goes
beyond 20 years, they get review at 20 years, with the presumption they will be released,
so the state has the burden of proof that they not be released.
P2 iterated the sacrifice and receiving inherent in all bill formation protocol:
The thing about legislation is that it is an ongoing process and it is very kind of organic.
It’s kind of changing as you go through. It was intended to be a process. It gets vetted
through all these interests and viewpoints and usually what ends up passes is something
very different from what started. And maybe that’s why they keep referring to it as
though it’s like making sausage because it never comes out exactly the way it goes in.

P2 also noted part of the process of negotiation and the role they played throughout:
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Anyway, there were these negotiating points on the table. Most of that happens in the
background. And I’m actually not personally involved in that. So, I’m kind of behind the
scenes. [name deleted here] is communicating with me about do you think the
membership can live with this and that? Ya know, he’s checking in but he's kind of the
one who’s doing that negotiation.
P4 asserted what they believed motivates politicians to compromise in order to make
change:
You have to look at it . . . it’s incremental politics. It’s incremental change. You can make
big change when you receive urgency from the public when they say “we’ve had
enough.” Like women’s suffrage, they said “we need the right to vote.” Similar with the
Civil rights act, same as the clean water act—these are all people marching for it and
strikes and revolt. So the people who are responsible for making the change will
compromise more than they ever would before. They do not want to see things get worse.
In this case the prosecutors came with what they wanted and they got that out of the
Senate, and then when it got to the House, the House started changing it. And they said
“that’s as good as it’s going to get and we’ll come back for it and fight for something
different another day.”
Individual Rights
Some of the participants in this study reflected on how influential civil rights were in the
creation of the new law. This amounted in a sentencing schematic that favored compassion
toward juvenile offenders. P4 observed the recognition of individual rights in this legislation may
not have been in line with what some of the legislators wanted:
Now, there was a lot of leeway to help change the sentencing guidelines to be in line with
the supreme court’s decision. And so, their original bill, I am guessing, was probably
more lenient, as is the way the republicans might look at it, toward the offender, than they
would have liked.
P5 commented on how a focus on profit generation served to undermine the rights of
juveniles in the prison system:
Also, criminal justice is a money-making machine and when you are willing to add more
bodies to the prison and pump up the numbers to get more money and funding for
whatever cause they needed at that point, they just needed the money, right? So, we have
2,000 more people coming to the prison and what they don’t tell you is that 1800 are
juveniles. Ya know, it’s just intense.
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P5 also observed how the juvenile sentencing process stripped people they knew of
freedoms that negatively affected opportunities that they deserved:
There’s a guy named [name deleted] who got 777 years as a juvenile. Because of that bill,
he’s now free, he has a home in Washington and is doing very well. For that to even
happen is crazy. There are people who are inside prisons now who probably shouldn’t be
there that are convicted as juveniles but they don’t have the smarts or the support system
to help with their cause to get them to their freedom. It takes that guy—every day his life
was consumed with helping others.
P6 remarked on the unique rights given to individuals protected under this new law:
That wave of oh, where’s the appropriate compromise here, but at the other end you have
the presumption of release, which isn’t available in other parole contexts in Washington
State. So, the person shall be released unless the ISRB finds that they are more likely than
not to commit a new offense if released. And also the de facto, or the virtual life,
provision of being in there as well was like wow, this is something that generally would
not be on the table. So anyone who’s serving 20 years or more having the opportunity to
be released after 20 years, provides that benefit.
Related Literature
It has been strongly noted a divide exists between the interests of safety of the
community and the rights of individuals throughout the literature review and interviews. There
are those who emphasize the disparity between marginalized populations and the more privileged
in sentencing practices. It is so extreme as to constitute its own form of public safety concern,
when all citizens are concerned. Bryan Stevenson (Sharma, 2014) articulated how his work
addressed this:
We have, for twenty-five years, represented people on death row, people who have been
unfairly sentenced, harshly sentenced, people who have been wrongly convicted. And
what’s always been in the backdrop of these cases is racial inequality, because an
extremely high percentage of the clients we represent are people of color. And then
poverty—all of the clients who are not people of color are poor, and marginalized by
poverty . . . I give these talks, and I tell people our systems treat you better if you are rich
and guilty than if you’re poor and innocent, and we see that every day. (pp. 4–5)
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Interestingly, the data from this research indicates that some of those whose role it is to
protect safety in Washington state. also acknowledge the importance of serving individuals’
needs.
Public Safety
The idea of the importance of public safety was considered throughout the duration of the
bill’s creation. The theme behind most of the statements pertained to fear which some believed
was more important to address than individual rights. P1 discussed the guard rails put in place by
the new law for ensuring those released had proven they were safe enough to
re-enter society:
The way the system is set up is every kid gets review at 20 years. So, they would be a
minimum of 37 years old. That would be the maximum. They would be presumed to be
released unless the state would present evidence that they would continue to be a danger.
There have been a couple of hearings now in front of the indeterminate sentencing review
board. Two or three have been released. At least here has been one I saw was not released
and that person will be released sometime in the next five years. They could set up the
next review as late as five years from the point of rejection.
P1 described a scenario in which a politician was motivated to pay attention to the
concerns of the community they served and the fire arms penalties that would grant beyond life
sentences for adolescent offenders:
Now, there are what become effective life sentences, which is why this 20 year review,
and a couple of Halloweens ago there was a case out of Tacoma and it was three kids
went around robbing trick or treaters, one of them had a gun and by the time you counted
out the gun enhancement for each of the individuals who was robbed, it was three or four
separate robberies, you literally ended up with one of these kids who was 16 at the time
with a sentence of 80 years because that enhancement stacked and this was a major
motivator for Jeannie Darneil, because it was in her district and were people frightened?
Yeah.
P2 remarked on the law’s allowance of keeping detainees incarcerated if prosecutors
could prove they would likely be a danger to society if released:
And in a bill like this, my memory is it went through some versions on issues like what’s
the minimum of time required. We see life without parole replaced with a presumptive
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release time, like 20 years, 25 years. And so I remember there was a discussion about
what that time period should be before somebody becomes eligible for release and then I
recall there was a discussion about whether there is a presumption that they get released
or no presumption at all, just a hearing or in our world we call it “who has the burden of
proof?” and that was a point where prosecutors ended up conceding that it would be okay
with a presumptive release unless there’s a showing that there is a specific danger
concern.
Vulnerability
Several participants reported believing juveniles in the judicial system were a particularly
vulnerable population and expressed the importance of being considered as separate than adults.
P5 commented on their own personal experience as a juvenile detainee who would be considered
appropriate for treatment as an adult in prison and the perceived lack of maturity needed to
advocate for themselves as a 15-year-old:
And I remember going into this lady’s office, her name is ______ , and to be honest, I’m
kind of torn on how this went down. I went into her office and she said “I don’t know
what to do with you. So, you can either go back to the hole or you can try to live out here
in population. Because you have such a long sentence.” And, to be honest, I don’t know
what I’m signing up for at the time. In population, what is that? I don’t really know. Or I
can go back to segregation and I don’t want that because I know what that is and anything
has to be better than that. So I was like “okay.” But to make that be the choice for a kid—
where you have to go into a very violent prison or you have to go into this mind-bending
game of solitary confinement dark place. What would you like to do? You just gave me
that as a choice? That’s rough. But, at 15 you don’t know what you are agreeing to at that
moment so I chose population.
P6 highlighted the progress that has been made in juvenile law since this law was put into
effect, which recognizes the special status juveniles have due to their developmental abilities:
It’s interesting. There’s been a lot of stuff that’s happened since the Miller fix in
Washington, and some of them I’ve alluded to. Both in the courts and the legislature. The
6160 around auto decline has been a big step in the right direction. Four offenses were
taken off the auto decline offense list. And those there aren’t even subject to discretionary
decline now. Those kids now are exclusively subject to the juvenile court system. And
anybody that was similarly situated prior to this bill could be facing a long sentence in the
adult system in all of those consequences . . . The passage of the Yer Act in 2015, which
increased opportunities of juveniles sealing of records, which eliminated most juvenile
legal financial obligations was a huge step forward for juveniles in the judicial system.
Related Literature
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Washington State Senate Bill 6160, which passed in 2018, further refined policy related
to juvenile status within the criminal justice system. In keeping with laws that incorporated a
growing body of brain development research, judges were mandated to consider age and
mitigating circumstances when delivering sentences. Additionally, the list for which a juvenile
would be considered automatically declined to the adult system was curtailed significantly.
Convicted young offenders who were once considered under the authority of the juvenile system
and were, as such, released upon their 21st birthdays were now held until their 25th. Bill 6160
also required the WSIPP to conduct research and deliver a report monitoring the law’s effects on
both public safety and individual rights (2018). King County Prosecutor, Dan Satterberg, echoed
the emerging consensus of both of these positions when he stated, “Sending a young person to
adult prison is a very serious decision that can have lifelong implications . . . In twenty years
we’ve learned a lot about the science of cognitive development and now it’s informing our case
laws and our practice” (Green, 2018).
Rehabilitation
The tendency to view juveniles as having the potential to learn to change their behavior
for the better was widely accepted by the participants in this study. Implications stemming from
this understanding helped bolster the idea that they could release into the community and
contribute pro-socially. P2 remarked that juvenile offenders are increasingly more likely to be
placed in rehabilitative programs than in detention:
So, that was about two decades ago, so it tells you that at that point, we were still sort of
in that heavy punishment, detention focus, so two weeks ago, we had no kids in
detention. And our average population probably runs ten. Two of the dorms are closed.
They’re only using one dorm now and have only been using one over the last several
years. So, the incarceration/detention is being used less and less and less in juvenile and
is becoming much more focused on programming and on re-entry and all of that. And I’m
hearing the same thing from the state facilities, that they’re still getting kids who have
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committed serious crimes there, but the population overall is diminishing because we are
using incarceration less and less.
P3 saw the rehabilitative model not only transforming the juvenile system, but the adult
system as well over time:
It’s interesting in the adult system that I spend most of my time now the push to going
more toward, I wouldn’t say a rehabilitative model, but a re-entry model, recognizing that
even if you are over the age of 18 when you are convicted of crimes, you’re still going to
go back to the community so we better make some investments to give you the tools to
re-integrate into the community so you don’t go back into prison, which is essentially
what we do with juveniles just more explicit—it’s a rehabilitative model rather than a
punitive model and that’s where I think it’s going to extend into the adult system more
and more in Washington.
Related Literature
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy is a nonpartisan agency charged with
examining the effects legislation has on the public after its enactment. Regarding juvenile justice,
WSIPP (2020) noted that adolescent offenders who served their sentences in adult prison
facilities were more likely to recidivate than those who did were juvenile detention centers.
Several programs offered to juveniles there have also proven to yield lower recidivism rates:
Education and Employment Training (Miller et al., 2015); Family Integrated Transitions (for
felons; Aos, 2004); and Functional Family Therapy (Barnoski, 2004).
Collaboration
Participants attributed the success of the bill’s passage to working with individuals and
organizations with different points of view. They saw importance in productive engagement with
each other, despite their positions on the relevant issues. P2 emphasized the value of making a
point to side with opponents sometimes:
But our effectiveness is couched in our ability to collaborate. Internally we’ve had quite a
bit of discussion recently within WAPO about making sure we are as clear about what we
are for as we are against. Because from a political standpoint, if you start walking into the
legislature, walking into meetings being held to work out bills and things and all you’re
saying is “no, we oppose this. No, we can’t do this,” then you start to lose your influence
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because pretty soon you are looking people in the eye and saying no all the time. So,
strategically, we’ve had that conversation within the Prosecutor Association that we need
to make sure that if we are going to go in and saying no to some things, we are also
willing to say what we will say yes to. Not just what we are for but what we are against.
Personally, that is what I feel is how we remain effective in the legislature.
P6 paid homage to the work of individuals and organizations who worked together to
bring about an important policy change:
There were a lot of stages and for advocates, a lot of different advocates with concerns as
this moves along. Some hope as well that this would be able to impact a number of those
who were convicted as youth who, under any other circumstances, wouldn’t have those
opportunities . . . I don’t know if it’s possible to evaluate the effectiveness of my sole
influence on the bill or -----------‘s influence on the bill just because there were a
coalition of juvenile justice advocates that were really pushing for what ended up being
the final product. And I think that collective influence was very effective. It could have
easily been the case that the WAPO bill, as introduced, where I think it was talking about
a 35 year minimum, where I don’t think it was separated out by age, could have been in
place. And so having the CLS’s, the WDA’s, the ACLU’s of the world working, and the
individuals—we can’t forget them—who were either subject to long sentences for
offenses they committed while they were under 18 or shortly thereafter—I think
contributed strongly to the effectiveness of 5064.
Summary
When the American colonies were first established through the first half of the 20 th
century, children were generally regarded as incapable of intent to commit crimes. Their
behavior was seen as a manifestation of the way they were nurtured. As such, the juvenile
criminal justice system focused its aim toward rehabilitating children, who were seen to have
malleable brains. The state was considered ultimately responsible for the well-being of children,
who deserved parental protection.
From the 1970s until the beginning of the 21st century, the tide turned in juvenile justice.
The once taken for granted parental role government played became increasingly punitive and
processed young offenders more similarly as adults. Adolescents were given less opportunities to
be detained separately and offered rehabilitative programming and, in fact, subject to the harshest
sentencing option available—life without parole.
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In 2012, the Miller vs. Alabama federal ruling reflected a shift back to earlier thinking
about juvenile defendants. Bolstered by development brain science, the mandate vastly restricted
life without parole sentencing and required that young offenders be afforded the chance to have
mitigating factors presented in criminal proceedings. Additionally, the current brain science
paved the way toward reintroducing the practice of rehabilitation for convicted adolescents, as
well as separating them from adults in prison. Here we see the federal government taking on a
more parental role that protects the young by investing in sentencing and programming that
serves more to teach than to punish. These concepts were revealed in all interviews conducted in
this research.
Once participants were interviewed, and their interviews transcribed, data analysis was
conducted. According to Giorgi’s (2012) descriptive phenomenological psychological method,
the researcher stated her potential bias in considering the data (“bracketing”). The transcribed
material was then marked as having different “meaning units.” These units are considered as
having been chosen with the investigator’s bias and would offer different information than what
another would choose at this point. The meaning units were scrutinized and noted when “direct
and psychologically more sensitive expressions” were determined, at which point “essential
structures” were gleaned (Giorgi, 2012, pp. 5–6). The labels given then represented a process in
which description of selected parts of raw data were drawn “precisely as it appears and nothing is
to be added or subtracted from it” (Giorgi, 2012, p. 6). This is a distinctive process from that of
interpretation, which requires the researcher to “add” meaning behind what the descriptive
researcher notes at face value. In this study, eight essential meanings were revealed once data
analysis was completed. They were: (a) influence, (b) culpability, (c) science, (d) compromise
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and negotiation, (e) individual rights, (f) public safety, (g) vulnerability, (h) rehabilitation, and (i)
collaboration.
Limitations
There were several limitations to this research worth noting. First, it cannot necessarily
be generalized. Themes emerging from a different state hearing list of testifying participants
could highlight other perceptions. Whether they would be more or less reflective ideas covered in
my literature review is unknown.
Additionally, one of the participants (P1) was interviewed when this project was in a pilot
state, which was in 2015. The others were interviewed over the course of 2018 and 2020. P1 was,
therefore, relying more on independent recollection than the others who relied on the transcript
of the testimony in order to participate. This potential discrepancy in memory may skew the data
in the sense that P1 may present as having been more strongly impacted by the experience
because they could remember it more readily than the others.
Future Research Implications
Since this research was centered around a legislative bill that was passed in 2014, it is
important to investigate how the trajectory of sentencing guidelines has changed since that time.
The assumption here is that increased knowledge and acceptance of brain development science
would continue to favor adolescents in the criminal justice system by providing more social
services and less detention time. However, in this recent political environment in which science
has been devalued by the heads of the federal government as a contribution to forming policy, it
would be interesting to know how that attitude has affected juvenile offenders (Lin, 2019).
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Appendix A
Interview Questions
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1) What was your reason or motivation for getting involved in in this specific legislation
pertaining to juveniles in the judicial system?
2) How are you personally and professionally involved in juvenile justice?
3) Had you ever testified in hearings before?
a) If yes, which ones?
4) Have you testified in hearings since this one?
a) If yes, which ones?
5) In this case, did you prepare for the testimony yourself or did someone else do it for
you?
6) What has your experience been throughout the various stages of Washington State
Senate Bill 5064’s passage?
7) How do you feel about the effectiveness of your influence on Senate Bill 5064?
8) What are your thoughts on the future of juveniles in the judicial system?
9) Why did you agree to participate in this research?
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Appendix B
Consent Form
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Project: Influencing Legislation for Juveniles in the Adult Judicial System: A Phenomenological
Examination of Legal Advocates
Researcher: Krista Franklin, Psy.D. Student in Clinical Psychology

You are invited to participate in a research study. The purpose of this research study is to
highlight the shared experiences of those who testified on behalf of legislation affecting juvenile
defendants. This research project is a degree requirement.
You are being asked to participate because of your involvement in juvenile advocacy during the
development of important legislation. On February 12, 2014, Senate Bill 5064, entitled “An Act
Relating to Persons Sentenced for Offenses Committed Prior to Reaching Eighteen Years of
Age” passed in Washington State. Your name was listed in the bill’s testimony as having testified
during the argument for the bill.
If you participate in this research, you will be asked to describe your experiences advocating for
juveniles. In addition to being asked to describe your experiences, you will be given a form to
complete that requests demographic information.
The risk inherent in this study is it may be difficult to discuss emotions tied to the experience of
having advocated for juveniles. Questions will be sent to interviewees in advance of the
interview. The primary reason for sending the questions out ahead of time is to spare participants
the experience of being surprised by what is being asked as well as to give them each a chance to
mentally and emotionally process their feelings before discussing the experience.
This research will add to both fields of psychology and law by illuminating the history of
juvenile legal regulations and the shared experience of those who advocated within that process.
The addition of this study will enhance the field’s understanding of the experience of those who
were involved in the development of important policy change, which has affected a vulnerable
population.
Your participation will take approximately 45 minutes to an hour. There will be no compensation
for this study.
Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. You may refuse to participate at all, or
choose to stop your participation at any point in the research, without fear of penalty or negative
consequences of any kind.
The information/data you provide for this research will be treated confidentially, and all raw data
will be kept in a secured file by the principal investigator. Results of the research will be reported
as aggregate summary data only, and no individually identifiable information will be presented.
You also have the right to review the results of the research if you wish to do so. A copy of the
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results may be obtained by contacting the principal investigator at the address below:
Krista Franklin
(206) XXX-XXXX
xxxxxx@antioch.edu
There will be no direct or immediate personal benefits from your participation in this research.
The results of the research may contribute to society as a whole. Your participation will serve to
educate the public about the unique and complex issues facing juveniles in the criminal justice
system. Furthermore, your contribution may inspire others to act on behalf of young offenders
for appropriate sentencing schemes and treatment.
Please note that this research study has been reviewed and Certified by the Institutional Review
Board, Antioch University, Seattle. For research-related problems or questions regarding
participants' rights, contact Antioch University’s Institutional Board Chair, Mark Russell, PhD at
xxxxxx@antioch.edu
The primary researcher conducting this study is Krista Franklin, who is a doctoral student in
psychology. Dr. Dana Waters is the supervisor of the research. She can be reached at
xxxxxx@antioch.edu. If you have questions later, you may contact Krista Franklin at
xxxxxx@antioch.edu or (206) XXX-XXXX.
I have read and understand the information explaining the purpose of this research and my rights
and responsibilities as a participant. My signature below designates my consent to participate in
this research study, according to the terms and conditions outlined above.
Participant Name (printed): _________________________________________________
Participant Signature:_______________________________ Date: __________________
Participant Phone Number:__________________________________________________
Is it OK to leave you a voicemail message on this phone?

Yes ☐

No ☐

In addition to agreeing to participate, I also consent to having the interview audio-recorded.
Participant Signature:_______________________________ Date: __________________
Printed name of person obtaining consent ______________________________________
Signature of person obtaining consent:__________________________ Date: _________
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Demographics Information
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Collected demographic Information for Participants
Initial Information Collected for Research Participants

Date: ______________________

Examiner Name:___________________________________________________

Participant Name: __________________________________________________

Participant’s Occupation/Title:

Years of Experience in Field:____________

Age: ___________________

Gender: Male / Female

Years of Education:___________________

Field of Study in College/Graduate School?:

__________________________________________________________________
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Identifying Culture:________________________________________________

Years in Washington:__________________

Children?: Yes / No

If yes: Biological?: Yes / No

Ages?:____________________________________
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Appendix D
Permissions
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Antioch.edu Mail - Copyright Permission 7/1/21, 5:13 PM

Krista Franklin <kfranklin@antioch.edu>

Copyright Permission
5 messages
Krista Franklin <kfranklin@antioch.edu> To: kara.pederson@thomsonreuters.com
Hello,
Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 10:45 AM My name is Krista Franklin. I am a doctoral student at Antioch University and am
preparing to publish my dissertation. I was hoping to be granted permission to publish the attached list of terms with
definitions from Black's Dictionary.
The dissertation will be published electronically at the following sites:
State that your dissertation will be published electronically in the following places:
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Database, a print on demand publisher, http://www. proquest.com/productsservices/pqdt.html
OhioLINK Electronic Theses and Dissertations center, an open access archive, https://etd.ohiolink.edu AURA:
Antioch University Repository and Archive, an open access archive, http://aura.antioch.edu
Please let me know if you need any other information. I really appreciate your consideration in this matter. Best,
Krista Franklin
List of Terms.pdf
68K
Pederson, Kara (TR Communications) <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters.com> To: Krista Franklin
<kfranklin@antioch.edu>
Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 11:11 AM

Hi – Thanks for reaching out. Will Black’s Law Dictionary be included in your list of sources?
Krista Franklin <kfranklin@antioch.edu> Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 12:45 PM To: "Pederson, Kara (TR
Communications)" <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters.com>
Yes, it definitely will. Sent from my iPhone
On Jul 1, 2021, at 11:11 AM, Pederson, Kara (TR Communications) <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters. com> wrote:
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Pederson, Kara (TR Communications) <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters.com> To: Krista Franklin
<kfranklin@antioch.edu>
Then we’re good. Good luck!
Krista Franklin <kfranklin@antioch.edu>
To: "Pederson, Kara (TR Communications)" <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters.com>
Thanks very much! Sent from my iPhone
Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 12:48 PM
On Jul 1, 2021, at 12:48 PM, Pederson, Kara (TR Communications) <kara.pederson@thomsonreuters. com> wrote:
Thu, Jul 1, 2021 at 3:13 PM
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=13a51a19cd&view=pt&search=a...=msg-f%3A1704113099302349851&simpl=msg-f%3A1704122240118915019
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